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ABSTRACT 
This thesis analyzes whether the frequency and length of military deployments, 
due to the Global War on Terrorism, had an effect on separation at the end of the initial 
service obligation for USMA (United States Military Academy) graduates between 1994 
and 2001. Two types of cohorts, those who were eligible to make the stay/leave decision 
before March 2003 and those who were after March 2003, are compared by using 
difference-in-difference estimation techniques. 
The General Deployment Model indicated that deployment had an adverse effect 
on retention. The results indicated that retention was 14.5% points lower for the period 
after Gulf War II (post-GWOT period). It was also found that as Army officers 
experience more deployments, their probability of leaving increases as well. An officer 
who deployed once is 7.3% points more likely to leave while one with two or more 
deployments is 10.7% points more likely to leave the Army, compared to an officer with 
no deployment.  
Models which compare hostile and non-hostile deployments indicate that both 
types of deployment affect negatively the decision to leave. However, non-hostile 
deployments had greater effects on the decision to leave than hostile deployments. In the 
post-GWOT period the effects of non-hostile deployments were even greater compared to 
officers in pre-GWOT period. Specifically, an officer with more than 15 months 
experience in a non-hostile area is 23 percentage points more likely to leave relative to 
his peer in the pre-GWOT period. 
 vi
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................1 
A. SCOPE OF THE THESIS...............................................................................1 
B. THE PURPOSE OF THE STUDY AND RESEARCH QUESTION..........2 
C. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY.............................................................2 
II. BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW ...................................................3 
A. INTRODUCTION............................................................................................3 
B. BACKGROUND ..............................................................................................3 
1. The United States Military Academy.................................................3 
2. Career Development of Army Officers ..............................................6 
3. The Global War on Terrorism and Its Effect on Army Officers ....9 
4.  Retention and Factors Affecting the Decision to Leave .................12 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW .............................................................................14 
1. “Serving Away From Home” by Hosek and Totten (2002)............14 
2. “The Effects of PERSTEMPO on Officer Retention in the U.S. 
Military” by Fricker (2002)...............................................................17 
3. “Effects of the Global War on Terror on Retention of Marine 
Corps Aviators” by Daniel Smith (2006) .........................................19 
4.  “Effects of the Global War On Terror on Medical Service 
Corps Retention Rates” by Erich J. Dietrich (2007) ......................20 
D. SUMMARY ....................................................................................................22 
III. DATA AND PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS .............................................................25 
A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................25 
B. DATA SOURCE.............................................................................................25 
1. Officer Master File.............................................................................25 
2. Active Duty Pay File ..........................................................................26 
3. Separation File ...................................................................................27 
C. DATA RESTRICTIONS AND LIMITATIONS.........................................28 
D. DEFINING STUDY POPULATION ...........................................................29 
E. MAIN HYPOTHESIS ...................................................................................30 
F. PRELIMINARY DATA ANALYSIS...........................................................30 
1. Dependent and Explanatory Variables............................................31 
2. Data Description by Year of Graduation.........................................32 
3. Data Description for Officers Leaving at the Initial Point.............37 
4. Data Description by Number of Deployments.................................39 
5. Data Description on Duration of Deployments ...............................42 
G. SUMMARY ....................................................................................................44 
IV. METHODOLOGY AND IDENTIFICATION OF VARIABLES.........................45 
A. ANALYTICAL METHOD ...........................................................................45 
1. Theoretical Model ..............................................................................45 
2. Multivariate Probit Regression Models ...........................................45 
3. Model with General Deployment Characteristics...........................46 
 viii
a. General Deployment Model ....................................................46 
b. Deployment Frequency Model................................................48 
c. Deployment Duration Model ..................................................49 
4. Models for Hostile versus Non-hostile Deployment........................50 
a. General Hostile Deployment Model .......................................50 
b. Hostile Deployment Duration Model .....................................51 
c. Hostile Deployment Frequency Model...................................52 
B. IDENTIFICATION OF VARIABLES ........................................................54 
1. Explanatory Variables.......................................................................54 
a. Deployment Variables .............................................................54 
b.  Demographic Variables ..........................................................58 
c.  Service Characteristics............................................................60 
2. Dependent Variable (LEAVE)..........................................................61 
C. SUMMARY ....................................................................................................61 
V. MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS RESULTS .............................................................65 
A.  OVERVIEW...................................................................................................65 
B. NOTIONAL PERSON (BASE CASE).........................................................65 
C. MODELS WITH GENERAL DEPLOYMENT 
CHARACTERISTICS...................................................................................66 
1. Interpretation of Demographic and Military Variables.................67 
2. Interpretation of Deployment Variables..........................................68 
D. MODELS FOR HOSTILE VERSUS NON-HOSTILE 
DEPLOYMENTS...........................................................................................70 
E. VALIDATION OF EXPLANATORY VARIABLES AND 
DISCUSSION ON MODELS GOODNESS OF FIT RESULTS ...............73 
1. Likelihood Ratio Test ........................................................................73 
2. Chow Test ...........................................................................................74 
3. R square Test......................................................................................75 
F. SUMMARY ....................................................................................................75 
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS...................................................77 
A. CONCLUSIONS ............................................................................................77 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS...............................................................................80 
C. FUTURE RESEARCH..................................................................................81 
APPENDIX.............................................................................................................................83 
A. FULL PROBIT RESULTS FOR MODELS WITH GENERAL 
DEPLOYMENT CHARACTERISTICS.....................................................83 
B. FULL PROBIT RESULTS FOR MODELS WITH HOSTILE 
VERSUS NON-HOSTILE DEPLOYMENTS.............................................84 
LIST OF REFERENCES......................................................................................................87 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST .........................................................................................91 
  
 ix
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1. Milestones of Separation for the Army officer ................................................28 
Figure 2. Percentage Distribution of Hostile Deployments for each USMA 
Graduating Class (1994-2001).........................................................................41 
Figure 3. Percentage Distribution of Non-hostile Deployments for each USMA 
Graduating Class (1994-2001).........................................................................42 
 
 x
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xi
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1. Infantry Officer Career Development Cycle......................................................8 
Table 2. Casualties in OIF/OEF.....................................................................................10 
Table 3. Number of Daily Attacks by Insurgent and Militias........................................11 
Table 4. Number of New U.S. Troops Deployed to Baghdad .......................................11 
Table 5. Summary of Previous Studies on The Retention Effect of Deployment .........23 
Table 6. Characteristics and Qualifications for Family Separation Allowance and 
Hostile Fire Pay................................................................................................27 
Table 7. Number of Graduates Between 1994 and 2001 ...............................................31 
Table 8. Number and Percentage of Officers Who Left at the 5th year Point ................31 
Table 9. Characteristics of USMA Graduate Officers Eligible to Make a Retention 
Decision ...........................................................................................................33 
Table 10. Characteristics of USMA Graduate Officers Eligible to Make a Retention 
Decision in Pre- and Post-GWOT Periods.......................................................35 
Table 11. Characteristics of USMA Graduate Officers Who Left at the Initial 
Decision Point in Pre- and Post-GWOT Periods .............................................38 
Table 12. Number of Officers Who Deployed for each USMA Graduating Class          
(1994-2001)......................................................................................................40 
Table 13. Number of Both Hostile and Non-hostile Deployments of Those Who Left 
at the Initial Point for Each USMA Graduating Class (1994-2001)................40 
Table 14. Distribution of Deployment Duration for Pre- and Post-GWOT Periods........43 
Table 15. Distribution of Deployment Duration for Hostile and Non-hostile areas........43 
Table 16. Interactions of Deployment Variables .............................................................58 
Table 17. Army Branches and Proportion Represented in the Dataset............................61 
Table 18. Summary of Explanatory Variables and Expected Signs ................................63 
Table 19. Estimated Marginal Effects for Separation Models with General 
Deployment Characteristics .............................................................................67 
Table 20. Marginal Effects for Hostile and Non-hostile Deployment Separation 
Models..............................................................................................................71 
Table 21. Likelihood Ratio Test results for Models ........................................................74 
Table 22. Chow Test Result for General Deployment Model .........................................74 
Table 23. Pseudo R Square for Probit Models.................................................................75 
Table 24. Summary of Marginal Effects of Deployment Variables ................................78 
 
 xii
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xiii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
First, I want to express my gratitude to my wife, Ebru Genc, who is my best 
friend who always encourages me to do my best; my son, Ege, who, after his birth, 
became the meaning of my life; my father, Sucattin, who inspired hard work and 
discipline into me; and my mother, Fehamet, who taught me patience. 
Secondly, I would like to thank my advisors, Professor Yu-Chu Shen and 
Professor Stephen Mehay, for their valuable guidance and understanding throughout all 
stages of this study. I would also like to thank Colin Rogers from the Defense Manpower 
Data Center for his precious efforts during the initial stages of the data gathering process.  
Lastly, I would like to thank my country, Turkey, and the Turkish Armed Forces 
for providing me with the opportunity to attain my Master’s Degree at the Naval 
Postgraduate School.  
 xiv
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
 1
I. INTRODUCTION  
A. SCOPE OF THE THESIS 
Since it was founded in 1802, the United States Military Academy (USMA) has 
been one of the most important U.S. Army officer commissioning sources. The main 
objective of this institution has been to train and educate future leaders. After completing 
a four-year academic program, its cadets have been trained to serve missions in almost 
every type of field as a platoon or company leader. As one of the oldest military 
academies, being a member of this family has always been regarded as an honorable 
status for its graduates. Despite these facts, beginning in the 1990’s, the U.S. Army 
started to experience a loss of its Academy graduates in much higher rates than in 
previous years. Specifically, in 2005, the separation rate of USMA graduates reached 
34.2%.1 This indicates that more than one third of the class of 2000  left the Army at the 
first opportunity. Such a rate surprised many senior officers and has attracted the 
attention of decision makers. 
The driving factors behind this separation behavior are: civilian job opportunities 
in corporate management; and jobs which provide better pay options and location 
stability for members’ families and better career development for the future. Recent 
studies have found an additional factor that may explain high separation rates: the 
Army’s operation tempo after the end of the Cold War.  
Gulf War I, and the ensuing humanitarian and peace keeping operations to 
Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo, have kept U.S. Army troops away from the mainland and 
their loved ones for longer periods. After 9/11, the number of these deployments 
increased rapidly due to more intense operations in Afghanistan. Recent changes in the 
political environment and key players due to the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) have 
proven that deployments will continue to be a part of life for all service members. 
Therefore, due to these recent developments in deployment cycles, retention has become 
a more serious problem.  
                                                 
1 Tom Shanker, 2006. Young officers leaving Army at a high rate. New York Times. April 10, 2006  
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B. THE PURPOSE OF THE STUDY AND RESEARCH QUESTION 
The purpose of this study is to identify the main reasons for the separation of U.S. 
Military Academy graduates. This will be accomplished by investigating whether the 
increased frequency and length of deployment, due to the Global War on Terrorism, had 
any effect on separation at the end of the initial service obligation for USMA classes 
between 1994 and 2001. The methodology of the thesis is to estimate difference-in-
difference models using logistic regression techniques. Two types of cohorts, those who 
were eligible to make the stay/leave decision before March 2003 and those who were 
eligible after March 2003 are compared by using this technique. The start of GWOT is 
defined as of March 2003. This is when U.S. troops first initiated Operation Iraqi 
Freedom. Therefore, the effect of GWOT is identified by comparing the probabilities of 
staying in the service between those who were eligible to make STAY/LEAVE decisions 
before and after March 2003.  
The primary research question of this thesis is:  
• Did deployments associated with the Global War on Terrorism affect 
retention decisions of USMA graduates?  
A secondary research question is: 
• What other factors might have affected the decision of officers to stay or 
leave? 
C. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY 
Chapter II gives background information and reviews some of the literature 
concerning operational tempo, deployment and officer retention. Chapter III gives brief 
information about the data and discusses the preliminary findings. The main hypothesis is 
also stated in Chapter III. Chapter IV explains methodology and identifies the variables. 
Chapter V presents the results of the analysis and tests. Chapter VI briefly states 
conclusions and provides policy recommendations. 
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II. BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter has been designed to serve two primary purposes. One is to give 
some information about how an Academy graduate develops, what steps he/she goes 
through during his/her initial service obligation, how current deployment issues have 
affected these soldiers recently, and, finally, what factors affect the separation of Army 
officers. Another goal is to examine and discuss methodology and findings of previous 
studies. In section B, the USMA is examined based on its education and training structure 
in three main areas: academic; military; and physical. Second, an officer’s career path is 
examined and the milestones are analyzed. Third, current deployments in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, which are believed to be an important reason for the separation of Academy 
graduates, are examined. The final part of section B discusses factors affecting separation 
of Army officers after the initial obligation expires. In section C, previous studies 
pertaining to both officer and enlisted retention issues are examined and compared. 
B. BACKGROUND 
1. The United States Military Academy  
When initially founded, the primary goal of the Academy was to educate and train 
the cadets as engineers and, after graduation, to send them to different construction zones 
across the country. At that time, the only curriculum in the Academy was civil 
engineering. The young lieutenants were primarily responsible for the construction of 
new railroads, bridges, harbors and roads all over the country. The biggest challenge for 
the new officers occurred when the Civil War started in the 1860’s. Luckily, both tactic 
and strategic success gained during the war by Academy graduates proved the quality of 
the Academy to the nation. The increasing importance of the Academy in the public’s 
eyes initiated new efforts to expand curriculums to include management and technical 
sciences  
Both World War I and II contributed many academic, social and physical changes 
to the Academy. Following them, every development shifted and increased the quality 
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and shape of the Academy’s education for over 50 years. However, the number of cadets 
has remained fairly constant since the 1960s. Each class begins with over 1,000 
freshmen in the first year and with about 800 cadets graduating four years later. The 
overall student population is roughly 4,000 at any given time. 
The Academy has a well-designed admission system that requires a candidate to 
meet academic, physical and medical qualifications. Applicants must be U.S. citizens, at 
least 17, but not yet 23 years of age on July 1st of the year of admission, be unmarried, 
and not be pregnant, or have a legal obligation, to support children. They are required to 
perform well on either the Assessment Program Test (ACT) or the Scholastic Assessment 
Test (SAT) and have good physical and mental health to pass the medical examination. In 
addition, they are required to pass the Candidate Fitness Assessment Test that consists of 
six elements, including a basketball throw, pull-ups, shuttle run, modified sit-ups, push-
ups, and a one mile run.2 
The difference between West Point and other academic institutions lies in its 
mission: "to educate, train, and inspire the Corps of Cadets so that each graduate is a 
commissioned leader of character committed to the values of Duty, Honor, Country and 
prepared for a career of professional excellence and service to the Nation as an officer in 
the United States Army."3 
The Academy provides three major programs to prepare its cadets for the 
challenges of the future: academic, physical and military. Each is given equal importance 
in contributing to the cadet’s education and training and its applications in the field. 
With changes in the academic program more than a decade ago, the Academy has 
been providing education in more than a dozen fields, consisting of majors in 
engineering, math, humanities, and social sciences. The entire class graduates with a 
Bachelor of Science Degree that meets the requirements of today’s Army. The four-year  
 
                                                 
2 United States Military Academy Admission Webpage 
http://admissions.usma.edu/FAQs/faqs_admission.cfm. (last accessed 09/2007) 
3 United States Military Academy Mission Webpage http://www.usma.edu/mission.asp. (last accessed 
09/2007) 
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academic program consists of a core of 31 courses that provides education in both the arts 
and sciences. It is designed to provide cadets the opportunity to select and work on a 
specific study or an optional major.4 
The physical program is designed to improve personal readiness for tough 
conditions that cadets should expect to face in the field. It consists of both educational 
classes and competitive athletics. Cadets are encouraged to participate in different 
sporting activities during each semester -- intercollegiate, club, or intramural level.5 
The military program is more extensive during summer months. It starts with 
basic training in the first year and is followed by field training in the second year. The 
third and fourth years are spent in an actual unit somewhere in the world that helps cadets 
gain more real life experience. Military training is also combined with military courses, 
which provide an opportunity to reinforce learning skills and military leadership each 
semester. 6 
Moral and ethical development in the Academy is the center of all education 
effort. The honor code for a cadet states: “A cadet will not lie, cheat, steal or tolerate 
those who do.”7The central fundamental values for cadets are duty, honor and country. 
The honor code and values are the core elements of the Academy that maintain integrity, 
trust and respect among cadets.8  
The Honor System depends more upon the Corps of Cadets than upon the 
supervision of the officers. Each year the cadets select from among 
themselves an Honor Committee for the purpose of interpreting the Honor 
System to the Corps of Cadets. The work of the Honor Committee 
includes the indoctrination of the new cadets in the principles of the Honor 
Code and the transmission of these principles from class to class. It acts as  
                                                 
4 United States Military Academy Academic Program Webpage http://www.dean.usma.edu .(last 
accessed 09/2007) 
5 United States Military Academy Physical program Webpage http://www.usma.edu/physical.asp (last 
accessed 09/2007). 
6 United States Military Academy Military Program Webpage http://www.usma.edu/military.asp (last 
accessed 09/2007). 
7 United States Military Academy Moral and Ethical Values Webpage http://www.usma.edu/Cpme/ 
(last accessed 09/2007). 
8 Ibid. 
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a grand jury reporting possible violations to the Commandant of Cadets. 
The Committee has no punitive powers and its functions being entirely 
investigative and advisory.9 
After graduation, cadets are commissioned as second lieutenants and are obligated 
to serve for 5 years of active service. At the end of the 5 year period, they either extend 
their service or leave the Army with an obligation to serve 3 more years in a reserve 
component. Additionally, cadets are commissioned into a service branch combat arms, 
combat support, or combat service support upon graduation. 
2. Career Development of Army Officers 
Army officers, commissioned after graduation from Reserve Officer Training 
Course (ROTC), Officer Candidate School (OCS), or USMA, follow a 3-phase career 
development plan which includes, in order, basic branch, functional area, and career field 
designation. The career path for an officer starts with his basic branch upon 
commissioning and grows parallel with his/her desires and educational attainment. “The 
basic branch is a grouping of officers that comprises an arm or service of the Army and is 
the specialty in which all officers are commissioned or transferred, trained and 
developed.”10 The Army branches include infantry, armor, field artillery, air defense 
artillery, aviation, special forces, engineer, signal, military police, intelligence, civil 
affairs, adjutant, finance, chemical, transportation, ordnance, and quartermaster. All 
officers, after being commissioned, begin training and education on their designated 
branch in Officer Basic Schools. The Officer Basic Course (OBC) provides instruction on 
methods for training and leadership and prepares officers for first duty assignments. 
Depending on the intensity of the course, it takes anywhere from 4 to 6 months to 
complete. Upon completion, officers are sent to their initial assignments and stay there 
for another 2 to 3 years. Following promotion to Captain, officers attend the Captain 
Career Course (CCC) in their designated branch for another 6 months. This helps them  
 
                                                 
9 Maxwell D Taylor,. WestPoint honor system: Its objectives and procedures available from 
http://www.west-point.org/users/usma1983/40768/docs/taylor.html . 
10 Department of the Army. 2005. Department of the Army pamphlet 600-3 commissioned officer 
professional development and career management. 1st ed. 
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develop skills, acquire details of company level leadership, and train on technical and 
tactical use of the company. Selected captains can participate and train at schools other 
than their basic branch.  
The second phase of the career path, functional area designation, occurs between 
the officer’s 5th and 6th years of service. “Functional area is a grouping of officers by 
specialty (other than an arm, service or branch) who possess interrelated groups of skills 
and perform tasks that usually require significant education, training and experience.”11 
The selection process, in principle, depends on both personal choice of the officer and 
academic and undergraduate degree among the same cohort. However, even after 
designated for a functional area, an officer stays focused on the company level service of 
the original branch. Upon completion of the Captain Career Course, most branches prefer 
that the officer serves in a company or battery for at least 18 months. Generally, a total of 
8 years of service as an officer is required for branch qualification. In the next 4 years, 
other options for the officer are made available for continued career development. Some 
of these options are Advanced Civil Schooling, Training with Industry, and Army 
Acquisition Corps. These are primarily supplementary-type civilian education to enhance 
the knowledge and skills of officers and are not available for all officers. 
In the final phase of the career path, officers are designated into one of 4 career 
fields following promotion to Major. The basic concept of Career Fields is to assign 
officers to a variety of assignments around their basic branch or functional areas. “The 
Career Field designation process determines in which specialty officers will continue 
their field grade development; either in their branch or in their functional area. All 
officers will be assigned to positions which require expertise in the particular specialty 
associated with each officer’s designated Career Field.”12 In this phase of career 
development, officers are qualified to attend command and staff college. This prepares 
them for the duties of Majors and Lieutenant Colonels. By the time the officer completes 
this phase, the number of service years total 17 or 18. The officer then becomes eligible 
                                                 
11 Department of the Army. 2005. Department of the Army pamphlet 600-3 commissioned officer 
professional development and career management. 1st ed. 
12 Army commissioned officer career information career patterns webpage 
http://usmilitary.about.com/library/milinfo/arofficerinfo/blpatterns.htm (last accessed 09/2007). 
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to be promoted to Lieutenant Colonel when expected maximum contributions by the 
Army as senior staff officers and commanders. Table 1 presents the career path of an 
infantry officer as an example. 
 
Source: DA Pamphlet 600-3 Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Career Management (2005) 





3. The Global War on Terrorism and Its Effect on Army Officers 
The Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) was first initiated by the President of the 
United States following September 11, 2001. Its aim was to find and capture the terrorists 
who attacked the World Trade Center and Pentagon. In particular, its goals were to 
prevent the terrorist organizations from organizing any further activities, prevent 
cooperation between terrorist organizations, cut the support lines of such organizations, 
and, finally, to have a more secure and terror-free environment for every nation in the 
world. The U.S. Congress passed legislation that authorized the use of military force 
against these activities immediately after the President called for all nations to act against 
terrorism together. Following this call from the President, more than 120 nations have 
participated in the war against terrorism by providing all kinds of support when required. 
The first use of military force was deployed to Afghanistan in 2002 when the country was 
believed to be the primary supporter of the Al Qaeda organization. Because of that, it can 
be counted as the start of the GWOT. Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) followed Operation 
Enduring Freedom (OEF) and targeted many other terrorist cells in Iraq as well as the 
dictatorship of Saddam Hussein. Hussein had been dictator of Iraq for over 20 years and 
consistently threatened neighboring Arab countries. Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan 
have been going on for almost 5 years and, as of September 8, 2007, the total fatalities of 
U.S. troops reached almost 4,300.13 Table 2 presents all casualties by service and 
component for each operation. 
                                                 
13 Defense Manpower, Data Center. Military casualty information 
http://siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/personnel/CASUALTY/castop.htm (last accessed 09/2007).  
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Source: Defense Manpower Data Center 
Table 2.   Casualties in OIF/OEF 
Table 3 depicts the number of daily attacks by insurgent and militias in Iraq 
between June 2003 and April 2007. There has been a considerable increase in the amount 
of insurgent attacks, beginning in June 2006. Accordingly, this increase has also resulted 
in more civilian and military casualties (both dead and wounded), when compared to 
previous periods. As a result of this development, the U.S. Congress decided to increase 
the number of troops, starting from January 2007, to try to stabilize Iraq. Table 4 depicts 
the increases of U.S. troops in Iraq since January 2007.  
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Source: O’Hanlon and Campbell (2007) 
Table 3.   Number of Daily Attacks by Insurgent and Militias 
 
Source: O’Hanlon and Campbell (2007) 
 
Table 4.   Number of New U.S. Troops Deployed to Baghdad  
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As of September 2007, the number of U.S. troops in Iraq and Afghanistan reached 
more than 140,000 and 18,000, respectively. Army active components constitute the 
majority of these troops.  
Data published in March 2006 indicates that 273,268 active duty Army personnel 
(officer and enlisted) have been deployed at least once since September 11, 2001.  
114,661 of these have been deployed more than once.14 Normally, Army personnel are 
scheduled to deploy for 1 year; however, increases in deployment frequencies, due to 
operational manning requirement, cause some personnel to stay longer periods and 
experience multiple deployments.  
4.  Retention and Factors Affecting the Decision to Leave 
Employee retention is a key challenge for both civilian and military organizations 
and is crucial to the long-term health and success of organizations. Although some may 
consider retention of the best employees within the organization a costly decision, they 
must understand that it may be more costly to recruit and train new employees than to 
retain existing ones. Civilian firms and organizations have the advantage of lateral entry 
that helps prevent them from suffering employee shortages, while lateral entry is not 
common in the military. Civilians use this advantage by recruiting anybody, anytime, and 
at any level. However, with few exceptions, the military does not accept lateral entrants 
since the hierarchy and the job experience depends heavily on seniority. Therefore, it is 
far more important for the military to retain people for at least a certain amount of time. 
In addition to that, it is more costly to recruit and train people in the military than in 
civilian organizations. While the primary costs for civilian organizations occur in 
advertising, recruiting, and on-the-job training, the military incurs advertising, recruiting, 
instructor and facility costs, and the opportunity costs of hiring higher quality individuals. 
Based on this, keeping the separation rate low is an important aspect of cost savings for 
the military.  
                                                 
14 Charles A Henning,. 2006. Army officer shortages: Background and issues for Congress. 
Washington D.C.: The Library of Congress. 
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When considering all three Army officer commissioning sources, one can easily 
see that the graduates of USMA are far more costly than accessions from the other two 
sources. During training, while ROTC and OCS include primarily tuition costs and some 
stipends, the Academy also includes facility costs, instructor costs, and costs of 
extracurricular activities and military training costs. From both monetary and non-
monetary aspects, Academy graduates are considered to be more valuable and are also 
very costly to replace.  
Because of the differences in commissioning sources, the Army uses different 
service obligations (known as Active Duty Service Obligation) for different 
commissioning sources to recoup the investment costs. The obligation is 5 years for 
USMA graduates, 4 years for ROTC scholarship recipients, and 3 years for others (non-
scholarship ROTC graduates, OCS graduates, and direct appointees).15 Additional years 
spent in education programs during or after this obligation results in additional service 
obligations. Following the initial obligation, officers are offered to sign for another 3 or 
more years to serve in the active component. For the Army, the 5-year point is highly 
important, since it is the first signal of retention. The end of the active duty service 
obligation has been used as the main retention point by many published studies, as well 
as by this study  
The primary factors affecting an officer’s retention decision do not differ by 
commissioning source. The main factors are related to economic reasons, such as better 
job options with higher earnings and better living locations in the civilian sector. Others 
are satisfaction with military life, harmony of dependents with the military lifestyle, and 
stable duty locations. As recent developments have forced members to deploy more 
frequently and for longer periods, the desire to stay in a stable location has increased. 
Additionally, higher education gained by the member during their service makes them 
more marketable and valuable to the civilian sector. This increases the chance that they 
will seek other alternatives. 
                                                 
15 U.S., Department of Army. AR 350-100 officer active duty service obligation, in Department of 
Army. 
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Another aspect of the retention decision depends on psychological reasons. Every 
individual graduates from the school with great enthusiasm and is ready to serve for a 
lifetime career in the Army. However, this enthusiasm decreases over the years with 
various incidents and problems occurring in the units. Some of these are due to seniors’ 
lack of leadership abilities; others are related to less effective and low quality 
subordinates. Unfortunately, these bad experiences cumulate over time and can lead to 
unwillingness to stay in the Army. 
All of these reasons contribute to a low retention and can create manning 
shortages of experienced personnel. Eventually, low retention increases the level of 
required accessions and costs for the Army and negatively affects the operational 
efficiency of troops. Compared to the Military Academy, gaining personnel to ROTC is 
relatively easy. There is a cap for the population of USMA and the numbers above this 
cap can be detrimental to the quality of education. Therefore, losing a West Point 
graduate is more costly than losing an officer from other commissioning programs. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
In this section, previous studies pertaining to both officer and enlisted retention 
are examined. Retention is a major concern for both groups, but the reasons for leaving 
are not always the same. When comparing both groups, it is easy to capture a remarkable 
difference in future expectation and motivation as well as education level. Depending on 
these differences, both groups may have different reactions to increased levels of stress 
and workload (i.e., long working hours, long and frequent deployments, hard job 
conditions, inconsiderate superiors, etc.). Therefore, it is not possible to generalize the 
result of any study for both groups. However, since the main focus of this study is to 
examine West Point graduates’ retention, it is appropriate and useful to understand and 
compare the methods and results of both enlisted and officer studies to provide adequate 
background for this study. 
1. “Serving Away From Home” by Hosek and Totten (2002) 
In their research, Hosek and Totten hypothesized that there are both direct and 
indirect relationships between service members’ decisions to reenlist and their 
 15
satisfaction with the type and frequency of deployments they experienced. They 
suggested that members learn and discover something new after every deployment. Each 
deployment, which includes characteristics of being away from the family, missing job-
related opportunities on training, and operating in high risk missions, affect members 
differently. Besides these negative sides of deployments, for some members deployment 
increases personal fulfillment and motivation. These people see deployment as a 
necessary step for their career progresses. Therefore, based on this learning and gained 
utilities, if the member likes being deployed, they predicted he would stay in the service 
for another term; otherwise, the member would prefer to leave once he completed his 
initial obligation.  
To explain this relationship, they followed a 2-stage methodology. In the first 
stage, they used the expected utility model to present how the feature of deployment can 
affect expected utility. In the second stage, they created two different probit models to 
explain the relationship between retention and different types of deployments. 
In the first model, they examined the relationship between demographic, 
education, economic and deployment characteristics of the member and his reenlistment 
decision. Two separate specifications of deployment variables were used while 
estimating this model. For the first specification “main-effect specification,” deployment 
variables indicated the number of hostile and non-hostile deployments. For the second 
model, deployment variables indicated combinations of both hostile and non-hostile 
deployments. Thus, all members who had both hostile and non-hostile experiences were 
considered in the second model. The deployment variables used in the first model 
reflected the direct relationship between reenlistment and deployment. On the other hand, 
Hosek and Totten also found an indirect relationship between them by examining the 
correlation between expected time for promotion to E5 and reenlistment as well as 
deployment and promotion to E5. They expected that if a member was deployed, it would 
also be a good indicator for promotion to E5.  
The data, which was collected from DMDC (Defense Manpower Data Center), 
consisted of service members who faced reenlistment decision between fiscal years 1996 
and 1999. It depended on 2 main data files: (a) the enlisted master file, and (b) the active 
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duty pay file. To identify the number of deployments by using the active duty pay file, 
Hosek and Totten counted the number of months deployed for every member over a 3-
year period, ending 3 months prior to his/her decision to stay or leave. Two variables in 
the active duty pay file helped distinguish the members who had previously deployed and 
the number of their deployments. These variables were Family Separation Allowance 
(FSA) and Hostile Fire Pay (HFP). Basically, FSA paid for all missions and assignments, 
which included at least a 30-day separation from the family, while HFP paid for only the 
missions in or close to war zones, regardless of the duration. Therefore, these measures 
did not cover every type of deployment. Deployments that were training-related or that 
were routine assignments less than 30 days were omitted. 
Findings from the first model (deployment-reenlistment model) indicated that 
reenlistment was higher among members who deployed compared with those who did not 
deploy. As the number of both hostile and non-hostile deployments increased, this effect 
remained positive, but tended to decrease. For example, while the marginal retention 
effect of non-hostile deployment was 0.265 for one deployment, it was 0.013 for 2 and 
0.021 for 3.16 This positive effect was also consistent, but less effective for hostile 
deployments. This result revealed that although members’ utility increased with the 
deployments based on the expected utility model, this increase was not infinite and was 
limited to a certain number of deployments. Hence, one could expect higher reenlistment 
rates as the number of deployments increase. 
The result of the second model (deployment-promotion and promotion-
reenlistment model) indicated that a member with a deployment experience had a higher 
probability of being promoted earlier compared to his non-deployed peer. Specifically, 
for members who had 2 or more non-hostile deployments, promotion to E5 was a bit 
faster. On the other side, the effect of hostile deployments was smaller than non-hostile 
deployments. The hostile deployments sometimes increased promotion, but sometimes 
reduced promotion, and, thus, shortened or lengthened the time to promotion. 
                                                 
16 James Hosek and Mark Totten, Serving away from home, 2002. Santa Monica, CA, Rand 
Corporation. 
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The authors’ effort to establish a direct causality between promotion-to-E5 and 
deployment might be considered a weakness. This is because one can easily notice other 
factors, such as effort and ability, affecting promotion to E5. Additionally, these factors 
are hard to measure and reflect in the model. Although use of AFQT scores as an 
instrumental variable for ability might account for some part of this correlation, lack of 
measurement for effort might still affect the results negatively. 
2. “The Effects of PERSTEMPO on Officer Retention in the U.S. 
Military” by Fricker (2002) 
Upon surveying active duty personnel in 1999, one of the major concerns arose 
with the answer to the question “Which is the most important factor for leaving or 
considering to leave the military?”17 Answers indicated that members believed 
deployment, which ranked in 5th place among 37 reasons, had a negative effect on the 
decision at the end of service obligation The result triggered Fricker, as well as many 
other researchers, to analyze the retention effects of deployment.  
In his study, Fricker tried to find whether there was actually a negative 
relationship between deployment and retention. Based on the survey results, his 
hypothesis was that the lower retention of officers is associated with higher deployment 
levels. 
His initial data, coming from the DMDC sources, included active duty officers 
serving between December 1987 and September 1999. He looked at all 4 military 
services separately to see whether there were any differences among them. He also 
separately examined junior (0 to 5 years of service) and midgrade (5 to 10 years of 
service) officers whose service obligations ended before September 1999. He looked at 
the follow-up year after the end of obligation year for each junior officer to determine 
whether he/she was still in the military. For junior officers, he estimated a logistic 
regression model. Since midgrade officers can leave the service at any time, he used a 
survival analysis technique to analyze retention of midgrade officers.  
                                                 
17 Department of Defense. 1999. 1999 Survey of Active Duty Personnel. DoD. 
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To identify deployment, he used the same 2 measures -- Family Separation 
Allowances (FSA) and Hostile Fire Pay (HFP) -- as Hosek and Totten (2002). Both were 
constructed from the DMDC active pay file records, which gave monthly information for 
periods away from home. FSA reflected the longer periods (more than 30 days) away 
from family, while HFP was used to identify the excursions into hostile regions of the 
world. As a result, he described deployment as “either periods away from home in which 
the service member drew FSA or a period in which he/she drew Hostile Fire Pay.’18 
Additionally, he added demographic and educational characteristics, as well as 
occupational categories, to his model to examine their effects on retention. He identified 
3 main reasons for adding occupational categories into the model. First, some officers 
(such as pilots) who were given special training before and after commissioning incurred 
longer initial service obligation periods. Second, some occupations, especially the 
technical ones, had better chances to find jobs in the civilian sector. Thus, these officers  
tended to leave as soon as the obligation ended to gain civilian experience and increase 
their earnings. Finally, differences in incentive pays across occupations could also cause 
some members to stay or leave. 
Based on the location served during deployment, he evaluated the effect of two 
kinds of deployments: hostile and non-hostile deployments. Since both have different 
characteristics and mission specifications, he hypothesized they would have separate 
effects on retention. Depending on an officer career development plan, he asserted that 
hostile deployments meant more for the ones who were looking for a future military 
career. However, on the other side, he suspected lower retention if the hostile 
deployments became longer and more frequent. In the study, non-hostile deployments 
were also hypothesized to be a negative factor affecting retention, since it did not include 
any operational experience for future career enhancement. 
His results showed that officers who participated in more non-hostile deployments 
had higher retention rates in all services. This was also valid for hostile deployments. 
Also, the magnitude of the coefficient was greater than for non-hostile deployments. This 
                                                 
18 Ronald D.Fricker. 2002. The effects of perstempo on officer retention in the U.S. military. Santa 
Monica, CA. Rand Corporation. 
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effect was different when comparing the hostile and non-hostile deployments for junior 
officers during the late 1990’s. During that period, junior officers who experienced more 
hostile deployments had lower retention rates than the ones who experienced non-hostile 
deployments. Consequently, he admitted that the results of the 1999 survey and his main 
hypothesis might not be correct. 
The shortcoming for the inability to measure the effect of short and unplanned 
deployments can be seen as one weakness for the study. Fricker assumed that these kinds 
of deployments were less predictable and mainly associated with routine activities and 
training. He admitted that they required a separate analysis since they might have a 
different effect on members. Consequently, he did not add these into the description of 
deployments. However, some of these deployments, which are short in nature, may be as 
difficult as the longer ones. Specifically, the frequent training assignments just before 
longer deployments or temporary missions in overseas may generate exhaustion of 
service members. On the other hand, the lack of non-hostile deployment measurement on 
single members generates another weakness for his study when the numbers of single 
members are considerably high for the junior officers.  
Because of the data limitations, Fricker was unable to establish a causal 
relationship between deployment and retention. He only evaluated whether or not there 
was an association between them. Therefore, in interpreting the results, he avoided 
stating that the deployments cause the decreased officer retention. 
3. “Effects of the Global War on Terror on Retention of Marine Corps 
Aviators” by Daniel Smith (2006) 
In his Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) thesis, Smith discussed and evaluated the 
effects of deployment on the retention of Marine Aviators before and after 9/11. He 
described deployment as having received 3 consecutive months of Family Separation 
Allowance or 2 consecutive months of Imminent Danger Pay. He estimated 3 logistic 
regression models for each period (pre and post 9/11) separately. In the first model, he 
evaluated the effects of the total number of deployments on retention by using dummy 
variables for zero, 1, 2, and more than 2 deployments. In the second one, he discussed the 
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effects of non-hostile and hostile deployments by considering the total number of 
deployments for both types. In the third one, he evaluated the effects of combinations of 
non-hostile and hostile deployments on the retention. 
The results of these three models on the pre -9/11 period indicated that individuals 
who have only one non-hostile deployment are less likely to stay than individuals with 
zero non-hostile deployments. Also, individuals with multiple hostile deployments appear 
to be more likely to stay than individuals with no hostile deployments. For the post-9/11 
period, he pointed out that aviators deployed more frequently than they were deployed in 
the pre-9/11 period. Results of the post-9/11 period showed that increased operation 
tempo is negatively affecting the retention decision. Using interacted variables, his results 
indicated that deployments negatively affect retention among post-9/11 aviators. As a 
result, Smith found that the deployment schedules were constantly modified since 9/11 
and created a negative effect on retention decisions of Marine Aviators.19 
While many other studies found a positive relationship with increased personnel 
tempo, the results presented in this study look quite different. The possible reasons for 
this difference may be because of the variables, the time and specifications of data or the 
assumptions. One observed difference is the period described for the deployment in each 
study. In their studies, Hosek and Totten described deployment as 1 or more months 
receipt of either Family Separation Allowance or Imminent Danger Pay. Smith, however, 
described deployment as 3 or more consecutive months of FSA receipt or 2 or more 
consecutive months of Imminent Danger Pay. 
4.  “Effects of the Global War On Terror on Medical Service Corps 
Retention Rates” by Erich J. Dietrich (2007) 
In his Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) thesis, Dietrich analyzes the key factors 
affecting the retention of Medical Service Corps officers and measures the possible 
effects of GWOT on retention. He used DMDC data and added information on Medical 
Service Corps officers between 1997 and 2005. He estimated logistic regression models 
                                                 
19 B. Daniel Smith. March 2006. The effect of the global war on terror on retention of Marine Corps 
Aviators. Master's Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA. 
 21
by looking at demographic, education, experience and deployment characteristics of 
individuals in the same model. To attribute the effect of GWOT, he used the difference-
in-difference analysis technique to estimate whether deployment increased the separation 
in pre- and post-GWOT period. He defined the start of GWOT as of March 2003 when 
U.S. troops first initiated Operation Iraqi Freedom. Design of the distinction between pre- 
and post-GWOT of his data analysis was dependant on the ending year of initial service 
obligation (4th year after being commissioned). The 1998 and 1999 cohorts, whose initial 
service obligation terminated before the fiscal year 2003, were defined as the pre-GWOT 
group, while the 2001 cohort was defined as the post-GWOT group. As indicated in the 
previous studies, Dietrich also classified the deployments as hostile and non-hostile for  
officers, based on the monthly information in pay records. He presented four models, 
including the same demographic and military experience variables, but differing only by 
deployment variable type. 
In his preliminary data analysis, he found that the percentage of retention in the 
pre-GWOT group was 84.49%, while the percentage of retention in the post-GWOT 
group was 72.47%, signaling a possible effect of increased personnel tempo due to 
GWOT. His final findings, after the regression models, did not support his hypothesis 
that GWOT had an adverse effect on decisions to leave. Retention rates for the pre-
GWOT period were 90.76% for those who deployed and 81.40% for those who did not.20 
This difference increased in his findings for the post-GWOT period, indicating a 
retention rate of 81.33% for deployers versus 68.60% for non-deployers. Thus, his 
findings suggested that deployments increased the job satisfaction and resulted with a 
higher retention. On the other hand, although his results were in favor of increased 
deployments, the difference-in-difference estimators were not statistically significant and 
had negative signs. Dietrich attributed this decrease on retention to other factors, such as 
alternative job opportunities for 2001, or increased work stress. Finally, his results 
supported previous studies that found deployment had a “positive effect on job 
                                                 
20 Erich J. Dietrich,. March 2007. Effect of the Global War on Medical Corps Retention Rate. Master’s 
Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA. 
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satisfaction and increased the level of personal fulfillment, thus, lead to the decision to 
stay more on the military” (Hosek, Kavanagh, Miller, 2006). 
D. SUMMARY 
The purpose of this chapter was both to provide some background information on 
retention and to analyze previous studies pertaining to the retention effect of deployment  
-- either on overall military personnel or on specific specialties. Although all of the 
studies initially hypothesized that deployment had a negative effect on retention of 
service members, only one of them found a negative correlation in the data. To provide a 
better understanding of the four previous studies, I found it useful to summarize the key 
elements of each study. Table 5 lists the hypothesis of each study, the data source, the 
methodology, and the main findings. 
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Table 5.   Summary of Previous Studies on The Retention Effect of Deployment 
 
Deployments in previous studies are identified as either hostile or non-hostile 
ones. Additionally, some also considered the duration of deployment by adding deployed 
months to the main models. Interacted variables between hostile/non-hostile variable and 
GWOT are created to attribute the effect of GWOT. None of the studies predicted the 
retention effect of the duration and type of deployment together. Thurs, in this study, 
interaction variables between deployed months and deployment type are created to 
explain this issue. 
Studies reviewed in this chapter revealed that understanding the effect of 
deployment on retention is crucial to determine future defense manning requirements. 
Specifically, considering the higher costs of West Point graduates, compared to other 
commissioning sources, retention effects become of major importance. Since, these 
officers are highly trained and well-educated; a minor change in their retention behavior 
means a lot for the Army. The goal of this study is to understand any adverse effects of 
deployment on retention, if there is one, and make necessary recommendations for 
decision makers, if needed. Similar to Smith’s analysis on Marine Corps Aviators, the 
analysis utilizes a logistic regression framework consisting of demographic, military, and 
deployment variables to discover their effects on the retention. A difference-in-difference 
estimator is also employed to calculate and compare the effect for pre- and post-GWOT 
period.  
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III. DATA AND PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide information about the data, discuss data 
limitations, and present some preliminary findings based on descriptive statistics and 
frequency distributions of variables. 
B. DATA SOURCE 
The data for this thesis comes from DMDC (Defense Manpower Data Center). It 
was constructed from three main datasets: The Officer Master File; the Active Duty Pay 
File; and the Separation File. Since the main focus of the study is USMA graduates and 
their retention behavior, the data is collected in a way that includes only information on 
Academy graduates who were commissioned between 1994 and 2001. At the beginning 
of the analysis, both data files were merged based on Social Security Numbers to create a 
single file to understand how many deployments individuals experienced and their 
retention decisions. From the total of 23,746 observations in the merged data file, 16,456 
of them were deleted due to either lack of information or discrepancies among the values, 
leaving 7,290 observations for the analysis. In the final phase of data work, 905 aviation 
officers were also excluded from the data, leaving 6,385 observations in the final dataset. 
1. Officer Master File 
The Officer Master File (OMF) includes demographic information for every 
individual in the armed forces. It has been tracking all active duty personnel since 1971. 
It has approximately 100 data elements which describe different officer characteristics. In 
our analysis, we followed the Academy graduates between 1994 and 2001 and collected 
the information on both first and last appearance of each graduate in the OMF. Therefore, 
there is information on both graduation day and the last day he/she last appeared in the 
file. The last information was collected in August 2007 for all observations, except the 
ones who separated before this data. OMF elements selected for this study include sex, 
gender, education level, pay grade, entry date, marital status, number of dependents, 
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primary service occupation, and flying status code. Previous studies have shown that 
demographic characteristics are often significant predictors of retention behavior. In 
addition to what previous studies used, to account for their effects on retention, military 
branch and command codes are included. Specifically, the hypothesis is that members in 
different military branches have different civilian job opportunities. Therefore, this might 
be one of the primary factors that significantly affect his/her decision to remain in the 
Army. Factors that could vary over time, such as marital status, number of dependents, 
and education level, were set for the information on last appearance in the OMF (either at 
separation or August 2007). 
2. Active Duty Pay File 
The Active Duty Pay File provides information on basic pays, special pays, as 
well as additional payments made to each service member monthly. Deployment pay is a 
part of this additional pay. For this study, I was interested in both Family Separation 
Allowance (FSA) and Hostile Fire Pay (HFP) which are commonly used indicators of 
deployment. Table 6 presents characteristics of these types and identifies the 
qualifications for eligibility.  
 
DEPLOYMENT PAY CHARACTERISTICS AND CONDITIONS FOR QUALIFICATIONS 
FAMILY SEPARATION 
ALLOWANCES (FSA) 
A service member with dependents is entitled to a family separation allowance (FSA) of $250 per 
month. This is in addition to any per diem or other entitlements, such as family separation housing 
allowance presuming that: 
• Movement of dependents to the permanent duty station at Government expense is not 
authorized. This presupposes that the dependents do not already live at or near that station;  
• The member is on duty on board a ship away from the home port of the ship for a period 
of more than 30 continuous days;  
• The member is on temporary duty away from the permanent duty station for a continuous 
period of more than 30 days and the dependents do not live at or near the temporary duty 
station. 
 
HOSTILE FIRE PAY (HFP) 
A member of a uniformed service may be entitled to Hostile Fire and Imminent Danger pay at the rate 
of $225 for any month in which he/she was entitled to basic pay and in which he/she was: 
• Subject to hostile fire or explosion of hostile mines;  
• On duty in an area in which he was in imminent danger of being exposed to hostile fire or 
explosion of hostile mines and in which, during the period he was on duty in that area, 
other members of the uniformed services were subject to hostile fire or explosion of 
hostile mines;  
• Killed, injured, or wounded by hostile fire, explosion of a hostile mine, or any other 
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hostile action; or  
• On duty in a foreign area in which he was subject to the threat of physical harm or 
imminent danger on the basis of civil insurrection, civil war, terrorism, or wartime 
conditions. 
 
Source: http://www.military.com/benefits/military-pay  
 
Table 6.   Characteristics and Qualifications for Family Separation Allowance and Hostile 
Fire Pay 
The study collected monthly information on FSA and HFP for each observation 
between the period October 1994 and August 2007 and identified deployment based on 
this information. For this analysis, the same criteria to measure deployment were used as 
in previous studies. Although DMDC has started gathering deployment information for 
personnel and building a deployment data file since 2004, it is new and not yet adequate 
for analysis. Therefore, it will probably take more time for DMDC to build a 
comprehensive data file which might help future studies. 
3. Separation File 
In the analysis, two elements of this file are investigated. The first is the 
separation date which gives information the date the individual left the Army. This 
element is used while calculating the number of years of service before leaving. The 
Separation Reason, the second element of this file, helped to understand the reason for 
separation and discriminate between those who had other reasons to leave from the ones 
who left right after the initial service obligation. Since elements are coded differently for 
different cohorts (coding difference starts with 1997), a two-stage procedure was 
followed for identifying the ones who left the service following the end of initial service 
obligation. For the classes before 1997, the years of service were subtracted and, then, 
concentrated on the ones with separation code 5.21 For the classes after 1997, the focus 
was on the ones with separation code 1.22 
                                                 
21 This code refers to “Early release in the national interest,” but was previously (before 1997) used for 
the definition of “Expiration of term of service” in this dataset. 
22 This code refers to “Expiration of term of service.” 
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On the other hand, during the first phases of the data analysis, there was a need to 
address another issue pertaining to identification of the time to separation. It is not 
reasonable to expect individuals to leave as soon as his/her service obligation ends. 
Separation is a process that takes some time. Some people might prefer to leave at the 
exact 5-year point, but some might not. This decision depends primarily on alternative 
civilian job opportunities or other future plans. Therefore, the assumption is that any 
officer who wants to leave following the initial service obligation will separate between 
the 5th and 6th year of service. Thus, this one year period allowed the analysis of both 
those who separated with the same reason in their 5th and 6th year. Fricker (2002) 
followed a similar methodology in his study. Below, Figure 1 is added to provide a better 








Figure 1.   Milestones of Separation for the Army officer 
 
C. DATA RESTRICTIONS AND LIMITATIONS 
The data for the analysis was provided by Defense Manpower Data Center on 
October 2007. Therefore deployments following that time are not within the scope of this 
analysis. Also, the classes before 1994 are not examined in this study. The reason for 
excluding the period before 1994 depends primarily on the implementation of the 
downsizing policy in the military shortly after the end of the Cold War. In that period, the 
Army revised its future manpower requirements and decided to downsize one-third of the 
force. Thus, new incentives were put into effect to help officers to leave earlier in their 
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effect lasted for another couple more years after the early 1990’s, it was useful to start 
exploring the effect of deployment starting with the class of 1994. 
In this study, the number and duration of deployments are identified by looking at 
the monthly pay records of every individual. FSA and HFP (described above in Table 6), 
two primary elements of active duty pay file, are utilized during this identification. 
However, as discussed in Fricker’s (2002) analysis, single personnel are not eligible to 
get FSA pay, so officers without dependents have no values in their records even if they 
were deployed to non-hostile areas in a particular month. However, it is still possible to 
identify those single officers if they were deployed to hostile regions by their HFP. 
Moreover, it requires a continuous 30-day assignment to be eligible to receive the 
additional deployment pay. In some circumstances, it is possible that some officers were 
deployed less than that period and shown as “NOT DEPLOYED” in the pay file. In 
addition to these two problems, HFP may also undercount the number of deployments in 
a specific month when an officer experienced more than one deployment, but was 
recorded as having experienced only one deployment. Consequently, HFP only captures 
one deployment for every month and ignores additional deployments in the same month. 
In addition, this data does not capture information on individuals who changed 
services during their careers. The method of collection of data allows us to work only 
with Army officers. Since the number of individuals who transfer is fairly small relative 
to the population, the assumption is that ignoring them will not effect this study’s results. 
Aviation officers who attend longer and more training cycles in their early careers 
are also not included within the scope of this thesis, since the initial service obligation for 
this group (8 years) is different from the other branches. 
D. DEFINING STUDY POPULATION 
To evaluate the effect of GWOT on retention, the merged file was divided into 
two groups based on whether the decision to stay in the Army is made before or after 
GWOT. For this study, the beginning of GWOT was assumed to be March 2003 when 
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) was initiated. It was after that time that many efforts to 
prevent global terror were concentrated and the number of deployments to both Iraq and 
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Afghanistan increased (see Table 3 in Chapter II). Therefore, officers whose active duty 
service obligation (ADSO) ended between 1999 and 2002 were identified as the pre-
GWOT group, while the ones for whom ADSO ended between 2003 and 2006 were 
identified as the post-GWOT group. 
E. MAIN HYPOTHESIS 
As discussed in the background part of Chapter II, the number of troops deployed 
to both Afghanistan and Iraq has increased. These increases were primarily the result of 
insurgent attacks which have dramatically increased in the last 2 years. As the number of 
troops increased, the duration and frequency of these deployments increased for both 
officers and enlistees. Consequently, the probability of experiencing more than one 
deployment for any officer is now higher than at anytime in the past. Although one can 
assert that deployments have positive effects on personnel by adding more experience, 
they also have some negative effects due to being away from family, missing some job 
related opportunities, and working in a high-stress and dangerous environment. In this 
study, it was hypothesized that the negative effects exceed the positive ones and, thus, 
there will be a negative relationship between deployment and retention behavior of 
Academy graduates. Additionally, as the number and frequency of deployments increase, 
retention will be negatively affected. It is also hypothesized that the coefficient of this 
negative correlation will increase after the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom. 
F. PRELIMINARY DATA ANALYSIS 
The final dataset consisted of 7,290 observations (including the 905 aviation 
officers) for the classes of 1994 through 2001. To test whether this number is accurate, 
West Point library research center was contacted in October 2007.23 Table 7 presents 
both the actual number of graduates and the numbers in this study’s data. When 
considering both datasets, one can easily notice that the numbers are slightly different. 
Although this study’s data has fewer observations than the actual, it contains more than 
                                                 
23 This data is taken from Maj. Harold La Rock , Chief of Institutional Research and Analysis Branch 
of United States Military Academy, October 10, 2007 in an electronic mail.  
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95% of the actual population. Possible reasons for this difference might be missing or 
dropped observations in this study’s dataset. 
Graduation 
Year 









1038 1005 913 913 873 933 934 903 7512 
Source: (a) Author’s tabulations from DMDC data, (b) Maj. Harold La Rock, chief of USMA Institutional 
Research and Analysis 
 
Table 7.   Number of Graduates Between 1994 and 2001 
As discussed in the previous part, aviation officers are not within the scope of this 
analysis. Therefore, these individuals were also dropped from the final dataset. Table 8 
shows the number of graduates in the analysis sample for each class. 
Graduation 
Year 
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 TOTAL 
Number of 
officers in final 
dataset 
884 782 792 761 739 813 825 789 6385 
Number of 
officers who left 
at the 5th year 
250 298 247 250 263 294 340 329 2271 
Percentage of 
leavers 
28.2% 38.1% 31.1% 32.8% 35.5% 36.1% 41.2% 41.7% 35.5% 
Source: Author’s tabulations from DMDC data 
 
Table 8.   Number and Percentage of Officers Who Left at the 5th year Point 
 
1. Dependent and Explanatory Variables 
The dependent variable (LEAVE) is binary and indicates the officers who left the 
Army at the end of 5 or 6 years of service. As discussed previously, all officers, except 
Army aviators, are obliged to complete 5 years of service before being eligible to leave. 
Therefore, the dependent variable (LEAVE) takes the value of 1 if the officer leaves after 
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the 6th year, and takes the value of 0 if he/she chooses to stay in the 5th or 6th year. The 
distributions of the leavers are presented in Table 9. 
The explanatory variables include demographic, military and deployment 
characteristics. Demographic characteristics include age, gender, race, ethnicity, marital 
status, and education level. The military characteristic includes military branch. 
Deployment characteristics are described as (deployed), (not deployed), (deployed to 
hostile area), (deployed to non-hostile area), (deployed to both hostile and non-hostile 
area), (number of months in hostile deployment) and (number of months in non-hostile 
deployment). 
2. Data Description by Year of Graduation 
Table 9 provides descriptive statistics and frequency distributions of the 
population analyzed in this study by year of graduation. Since the main focus of this 
study is to compare the deployment effect in the pre- and post-GWOT period, similar 
descriptive statistics are presented for only these two periods in Table 10. 
Characteristics 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 TOTAL 
Separation Rate (%) 28.28 38.11 31.19 32.85 35.59 36.16 41.21 41.70 35.57 
Age (mean) 29.2 29.1 29.3 29.2 28.6 28.7 27.9 27.5 28.7 
Gender (%)          
Male 87.22 87.21 89.77 89.49 87.55 85.98 84.61 83.40 86.88 
Female 12.78 12.79 10.23 10.51 12.45 14.02 15.39 16.60 13.12 
Race (%)          
White 85.52 86.96 87.50 85.81 88.23 86.47 83.15 87.20 86.31 
Black 6.22 6.39 7.45 7.36 4.87 6.40 7.27 6.46 6.56 
Other Race 8.26 6.65 5.05 6.83 6.90 7.13 9.58 6.34 7.13 
Ethnicity (%)          
Hispanic 3.51 3.96 3.79 4.07 4.06 3.32 4.24 4.56 3.93 
Other Ethnicity 96.49 96.04 96.21 95.93 95.94 96.68 95.76 95.44 96.07 
Marital/Dependency 
Status (%) 
         
Married with children 51.92 52.46 60.35 58.74 52.10 55.97 51.76 48.04 53.89 
Married without children 5.43 4.99 3.28 5.26 4.47 4.92 4.97 5.83 4.90 
Single with children 2.38 2.17 1.52 1.18 2.57 1.11 1.70 1.52 1.77 
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Single without children 40.05 40.28 34.85 34.69 40.73 38.01 41.58 44.61 39.37 
Education Level (%)          
Baccalaureate Degree 78.28 82.86 78.54 82.65 85.12 84.99 88.73 90.75 83.93 
Master’s Degree or higher 21.72 17.13 21.47 17.34 14.89 15.01 11.27 9.25 16.07 
Military Branch (%)          
Combat 68.55 65.22 75.00 73.85 73.34 69.62 72.48 71.36 71.12 
Combat Support 11.65 18.03 13.38 14.45 12.99 13.90 13.94 17.24 14.41 
Combat Service Support 19.80 16.75 11.62 11.70 13.67 16.48 13.58 11.41 14.47 
Deployment (%)          
Deployed 78.73 88.11 88.26 64.39 72.67 93.11 95.76 96.70 84.90 
Not deployed 21.27 11.89 11.74 35.61 27.33 6.89 4.24 3.30 15.10 
Deployment Type(%)          
Only hostile deployment 9.84 6.78 7.83 25.62 28.96 0.86 0.61 0.63 9.84 
Only non-hostile 
deployment 
25.34 23.15 18.81 9.20 5.68 22.14 14.18 9.76 16.29 
Both hostile and non-
hostile deployment 
43.55 58.18 61.62 29.57 38.02 70.11 80.97 86.31 58.78 
Deployment(Hostile) %          
Hostile Deployments 53.39 64.96 69.44 55.19 66.98 70.97 81.58 86.95 68.61 
No Hostile Deployment 46.61 35.04 30.56 44.81 33.02 29.03 18.42 13.05 31.39 
Deployment(Non-hostile) 
% 
         
Non-hostile Deployments 68.89 81.33 80.43 38.76 43.71 92.25 95.15 96.07 75.07 
No Non-hostile 
deployments 
31.11 18.67 19.57 61.24 56.29 7.75 4.85 3.93 24.93 
Months of hostile 
deployment (mean) 
3.13 3.75 3.64 3.37 5.32 6.12 9.82 12.09 5.90 
Months of non-hostile 
deployment (mean) 
2.77 2.67 2.78 1.67 3.92 7.92 9.82 10.54 5.11 
Source: Author’s tabulations from DMDC data 
 









Characteristics Pre-GWOT cohorts Post-GWOT cohorts 
Separation Rate (%)*** 32.46 38.72 
Deployment Rate(%)   
Deployed*** 79.96 89.92 
Not deployed*** 20.04 10.08 
Deployment Type(%)   
Only hostile deployment*** 12.33 7.30 
Only non-hostile deployment*** 19.38 13.14 
Both hostile and non-hostile 
deployment*** 48.24 69.49 
Deployment(Hostile) %   
Hostile Deployments*** 60.58 76.78 
No Hostile Deployment*** 39.42 23.22 
Deployment(Non-hostile) %   
Non-Hostile Deployments*** 67.63 82.63 
No Non-hostile deployments*** 32.37 17.37 
Months of hostile deployment 
(mean)+++ 
3.46 8.38 
Months of non-hostile deployment 
(mean)+++ 
2.49 7.77 
Age (mean)+++ 29.22 28.21 
Gender (%)   
Male*** 88.38 85.34 
Female*** 11.62 14.66 
Race (%)   
White 86.42 86.20 
Black 6.83 6.29 
Other race 7.52 6.74 
Ethnicity (%)   
Hispanic 3.82 4.04 
Other ethnicity 96.18 95.96 
Marital/Dependency Status (%)   
Married with children*** 55.76 51.99 
Married without children 4.75 5.05 
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Single with children 1.83 1.71 
Single without children*** 37.56 41.22 
Education Level (%)   
Baccalaureate Degree*** 80.49 87.43 
Master’s Degree or higher*** 19.51 12.57 
Military Branch (%)   
Combat 70.58 71.67 
Combat Support 14.29 14.53 
Combat Service Support 15.13 13.80 
Source: Author’s tabulations from DMDC data 
 
*** Pearson’s Chi-Sq statistic significant at 0.01 level  
(Comparing pre- and post-GWOT) 
**  Pearson’s Chi-Sq statistic significant at 0.05 level  
(Comparing pre- and post-GWOT) 
* Pearson’s Chi-Sq statistic significant at 0.10 level  
(Comparing pre- and post-GWOT) 
+++ T statistic for difference in means significant at 0.01 level  
++ T statistic for difference in means significant at 0.05 level 
+ T statistic for difference in means significant at 0.10 level 
 
Table 10.   Characteristics of USMA Graduate Officers Eligible to Make a Retention 
Decision in Pre- and Post-GWOT Periods 
 
Analyzing the results of preliminary data helps to understand and evaluate the 
characteristics as well as retention behavior of groups in a better way. First of all, as 
stated in the main hypothesis, it was noticed that there is a significant difference in the 
probability of leaving at the initial decision point between the pre- and post-GWOT 
groups. The probability of leaving in pre-GWOT officers is 32.46% compared to 38.72% 
for post-GWOT officers. The increase is roughly 6 points. When the difference was 
tested between groups, the Chi-sq test result indicates that the difference is statistically 
significant. On the other hand, by looking at the mean of age for each group, it was 
noticed that there is a one year age difference between groups which is statistically 
significant. Although the admission requirements have not been changed for over 20 
years, this might indicate that earlier age groups might have been more eager to join the 
 36
Army for the last 10-15 years compared to previous years. Furthermore, the results show 
that, over the years, there is a decline in male graduates compared to female graduates. 
The proportion of females increases from 11.62% to 14.66% for the last four classes. 
Two groups significantly vary for married with dependent and single without dependent. 
Officers who are married and have dependents account for 55.76% for pre-GWOT 
period. For post-GWOT period single officers without dependents decrease 4 percentage 
points compared to pre-GWOT period. This difference is statistically significant and 
indicates that officers in post- period are more reluctant to get married until their first 
decision point compared to their peers in pre- period. The difference might possibly 
depend on deployment frequency and duration. Specifically, the nature of hostile 
deployment might be an obstacle for officers to establish a family life, since it is hard for 
them to find the right person in a short amount of time between continuous deployments. 
Other marriage characteristics such as single with dependent and married without 
dependent, are almost similar for both periods and do not vary much between the two 
groups. Education is another element that changes between groups. Attaining higher 
education for an officer requires time, money, and effort while he/she is following daily 
routine schedule in the base. Therefore, as mentioned in marital status, it is hard to expect 
officers to attain higher education while they are deployed overseas, since they do not 
have enough opportunities to follow the classes. Results show that there is almost a 6% 
point decrease in attaining a Master’s Degree between groups and this difference is 
statistically significant. On the other hand, even though this difference was found to be 
statistically significant, there is a general tendency to attain higher education for the 
classes 1994 through 1998. This is because this study followed these classes for longer 
periods than the post-GWOT cohorts in my dataset.  
Among three different types of military branches, it was observed that none of 
them is remarkably different from the others for each period. Minor differences between 
two groups are not statistically significant. On the other hand, results indicate that 
deployment experiences vary between groups. Although both group members have 
deployment rates above 75%, the rate of deployment reaches almost 90% for the post-
GWOT group. This is not an unexpected result, since it is known that deployment to Iraq 
 37
and Afghanistan is the biggest reason of this sharp increase. Looking at Table 9 gives 
more evidence on this sudden increase in deployments. Until the class of 1999, 70-75% 
of the officers on average for each class experience deployments in their first 5 years. The 
trend changes suddenly with class 1999 and jumps to 93% and keeps increasing gradually 
for the other two classes. It seems that not only hostile, but also non-hostile deployments, 
over the last few years contributed to this sudden change. Note that the rate of both types 
increases dramatically. Differences in hostile and non-hostile deployments, as well as the 
difference in rate of deployment, are statistically significant. It also seems that increases 
in the rate of being deployed affects the duration of deployments and extends the number 
of days in deployments. Average months in hostile deployments for pre-GWOT officers 
are roughly three times (3.46 months to 8.38 months) less than the post-GWOT officers. 
This fact also remains unchanged for the non-hostile deployments (2.49 months to 7.7 
months).  
3. Data Description for Officers Leaving at the Initial Point 
In Table 9 and Table 10 above, the results of descriptive statistics for the whole 
population are presented. Numbers in these tables identify the behavior of all graduates of 
the Academy. Table 11 presents the numbers for those who left at the initial point. Thus, 
it gives more comprehensive evidence on how officers who left at the 5- year point 
reacted to recent increase on deployments.  
Characteristics Pre-GWOT Period Post-GWOT Period 
Separation Rate (%) 32.46 38.72 
Deployment (%)   
Deployed*** 82.87 94.37 
Not deployed*** 17.13 5.63 
Deployment Type (%)   
Only hostile deployment*** 13.40 5.71 
Only non-hostile deployment*** 20.67 13.95 
Both hostile and non-hostile deployment*** 
48.80 74.71 
Deployment(Hostile) %   
Hostile Deployments*** 62.20 80.42 
No Hostile Deployment*** 37.80 19.58 
Deployment(Non-hostile) %   
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Non-hostile Deployments*** 69.47 88.66 
No Non-hostile deployments*** 30.53 11.34 
Months of hostile deployment (mean)+++ 3.66 8.90 
Months of non-hostile deployment 
(mean)+++ 
2.36 7.90 
Age (mean)+++ 27.30 27.26 
Gender (%)   
Male*** 88.61 84.69 
Female*** 11.39 15.91 
Race (%)   
White 88.33 87.52 
Black 5.55 5.22 
Other race 6.12 7.26 
Ethnicity (%)   
Hispanic 3.54 3.92 
Other ethnicity 96.46 96.08 
Marital/Dependency Status (%)   
Married with children 45.65 44.45 
Married without children 6.41 5.55 
Single with children 1.34 1.55 
Single without children 46.41 48.45 
Education Level (%)   
Baccalaureate Degree** 97.51 95.60 
Master’s Degree** 2.49 4.40 
Military Branch (%)   
Combat 67.37 69.00 
Combat Support 16.56 16.39 
Combat Service Support 16.08 14.61 
Source: Author’s tabulations from DMDC data 
*** Pearson’s Chi-Sq statistic significant at 0.01 level 
(Comparing pre- and post-GWOT) 
**  Pearson’s Chi-Sq statistic significant at 0.05 level 
(Comparing pre- and post-GWOT) 
* Pearson’s Chi-Sq statistic significant at 0.10 level 
(Comparing pre- and post-GWOT) 
+++ T statistic for difference in means significant at 0.01 level 
++ T statistic for difference in means significant at 0.05 level 
+ T statistic for difference in means significant at 0.10 level 
Table 11.   Characteristics of USMA Graduate Officers Who Left at the Initial Decision Point 
in Pre- and Post-GWOT Periods 
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Tabulations in Table 11 indicate that among those who left at the initial decision 
point, whites are 88% of pre-GWOT period leavers, while they are 87% of the post-
GWOT period. The representation of other race and ethnicities is almost unchanged in 
each period. Another change occurs for those who left with Master’s Degrees. Although 
the difference (2% points) does not appeal to be significant, 50% increase (from 2.49% to 
4.40%) in this category indicates that, after completion of a Master’s Degree, an officer is 
more eager to leave in the post-GWOT period compared to the pre-GWOT period. 
Although the number of officers with Master’s Degrees seems to have decreased in the 
post-GWOT period (as discussed on pg.37, this is not an absolute decrease, since the 
number of individuals completing Master’s Program within the first five years could not 
be restricted), the effect of completion increases. Deployment still seems to be one of the 
reasons for leaving as was observed over 18% points increase (%69.47 for pre-GWOT 
period and 88.66% for post-GWOT period) between the groups. An approximately 300% 
increase in average months in deployment, for both hostile and non-hostile deployment, 
seems to be a factor explaining the cause for the increase in the separation rate in the 
post-GWOT period. 
4. Data Description by Number of Deployments 
Alternative elements of data can provide evidence for different aspects of the 
study. Therefore, when looking at the number of deployments for each graduating class, 
it was noticed that a remarkable proportion of the sample experienced more than one 
deployment up to the initial decision point in the 5th year. This fact led to analyzing the 
effect of frequency of deployment in addition to type of deployment. Theoretically, based 
on the hypothesis, it is expected to see lower retention rates as the deployment frequency 
increases. Therefore, when comparing two officers with a different number of 
deployments, due to having higher combat exhaustion as well as higher stress, it is 
possible to see that the one with more deployment experience will have a higher 
probability to leave at the first opportunity. Because of this, Table 12 presents the number 
of deployments of those who left at the initial point for each graduating class and for each 
period and compares these numbers to hostile and non-hostile deployments (Table 13). In  
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addition to that, graphical distributions of this comparison are presented in Figures 2 and 
3 below. Further discussion of the effect of increased number of deployments will also be 
discussed in the following chapter. 
 
Pre-GWOT Post-GWOT Number of 
Deployments 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
TOTAL 
No Deployment 188 93 93 271 202 56 35 26 964 
1 deployment 212 170 146 144 123 142 94 74 1105 
More than 1 
deployment 
484 519 553 346 414 615 696 689 4316 
Total Number of 
Officers 
884 782 792 761 739 813 825 789 6385 
Source: Author’s tabulations from DMDC data 
 





1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 TOTAL 
No Hostile 
Deployments 
412 274 242 341 244 236 152 103 2004 
1 hostile 
deployment 
166 155 198 212 220 211 138 103 1403 
More than 1 
hostile 
deployment 




275 146 155 466 416 63 40 31 1592 
1 non-hostile 
dep. 
269 313 271 186 176 431 462 462 2570 
More than 1 
non-hostile 
deployment 
340 323 366 109 147 319 323 296 
2223 
Source: Author’s tabulations from DMDC data 
 
Table 13.   Number of Both Hostile and Non-hostile Deployments of Those Who Left at the 
Initial Point for Each USMA Graduating Class (1994-2001) 
 
Tables 12 and 13 and Figure 2 provide clear evidence of an increased deployment 
tempo for the last three classes of Academy graduates. Specifically, the sudden changes 
in the number of deployments occur for the class of 2000. While the rate is 45% for the  
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members of class 1999, it goes up to 65% for the following class. This indicates that not 
only does the number of officers who experience deployment increase, but also frequency 
of deployment.  
































1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
No Hostile Deployments 1 hostile deployment More than 1 hostile deployments
 
Source: Author’s tabulations from DMDC data 
 
Figure 2.   Percentage Distribution of Hostile Deployments for each USMA Graduating 
Class (1994-2001) 
 
From the non-hostile perspective, the situation is a bit different. Although the 
number of officers who experience non-hostile deployments increases dramatically over 
the years, it is hard to detect a sharp increase in the frequency. The number of officers 
who experience more than one non-hostile deployment almost remains the same over the 
years. On the other hand, the classes of 1997 and 1998 have surprisingly more officers 
who do not have any experience in non-hostile missions relative to other graduating 
classes.  
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PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF NON-HOSTILE 






























1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
No Non-hostile deployments 1 non-hostile dep.
More than 1non-hostile deployments
 
Source: Author’s tabulation from DMDC data 
Figure 3.   Percentage Distribution of Non-hostile Deployments for each USMA 
Graduating Class (1994-2001) 
 
5. Data Description on Duration of Deployments 
Previous studies discuss the importance of duration of deployment as much as 
type of deployment. Logically, one can also expect to see that as deployments get longer 
they become harder for both the soldiers and their families. In addition to that, since 
deployments are generally planned as unit deployments in order to have better cohesion, 
some officers might have to serve longer terms when he/she is assigned to another unit 
which is already prepared for deployment when he is planning for the return. Tables 9, 
10, and 11 show that average duration of deployment is almost three times higher for 
post-GWOT period than pre-GWOT. They do not give a clear explanation of the duration 
characteristics of deployments. Therefore, based on tabulations of the dataset, duration 
was categorized into three separate groups: 0 months deployed, 1-15 months deployed, 
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and deployed more than 15 months. This helped to understand whether there is a 
significant difference across groups and periods (pre- and post-GWOT). Table 14 
presents the results of the three duration categories for both periods. Groups were created 
for different type of deployments to compare. Table 15 explains the same concept from 
the perspective of hostile and non-hostile deployments. 
Deployment duration (%) 
Pre-GWOT Post-GWOT 
0 months Deployed+++ 20.04% 10.08% 
1-15 months deployed+++ 71.89% 38.95% 
More than 15 months 
deployed+++ 
8.08% 50.98% 
Source: Author’s Tabulations from DMDC data 
 
+++ T statistic for difference in means significant at 0.01 level 
++ T statistic for difference in means significant at 0.05 level 
+ T statistic for difference in means significant at 0.10 level 
 
Table 14.   Distribution of Deployment Duration for Pre- and Post-GWOT Periods 
 
The difference in mean length of duration between the two groups is statistically 
significant. Therefore, it seems that deployment duration has increased dramatically in 
the post-GWOT period. 
Deployment Duration (%) 
Pre-GWOT Post-GWOT 
0 months Deployed to hostile area+++ 39.42% 23.22% 
1-15 months deployed to hostile area++ 58.87% 61.50% 
More than 15 months deployed to hostile area+++ 1.71% 15.29% 
0 months Deployed to hostile area+++ 32.37% 17.37% 
1-15 months deployed to hostile area+++ 66.42% 70.78% 
More than 15 months deployed to hostile area+++ 1.21% 11.84% 
Source: Author’s Tabulations from DMDC data 
 
+++ T statistic for difference in means significant at 0.01 level 
++ T statistic for difference in means significant at 0.05 level 
+ T statistic for difference in means significant at 0.10 level 
 




The main focus of this chapter is to understand and analyze the dataset. By 
looking at the preliminary findings, it was observed that there is an unexpected increase 
in the separation rate starting with the graduates of 1998 (Table 10) at the initial decision 
point (i.e., the first cohort that makes the initial STAY decision after 2003). Results of 
demographic characteristics, such as education, marital status, and gender support, these 
findings and indicate that they might be the factors that contribute to the change in rates. 
In addition to that, significant differences between the frequency of hostile and non-
hostile deployments for the focus groups helps to explain this increase in attrition level. 
Besides deployment among officers who left at the initial point, additional education 
contributes significantly to this change. Tabulations indicated that the number of officers 
who left with Master’s Degrees has doubled for the post-GWOT period compared to pre-
GWOT period. In the following two chapters, models to explain these differences are 




IV. METHODOLOGY AND IDENTIFICATION OF VARIABLES 
A. ANALYTICAL METHOD 
1. Theoretical Model 
Probit models are utilized for this study. Probit models are designed for binary 
dependent variables which are bounded between zero and one. Instead of using linear 
probability models in which the predicted probabilities can drop below 0 or exceed 1 for 
some values, nonlinear models are used to restrict the predicted values to lie between 0 
and 1. In this analysis, the binary dependent variable takes the value of 1 if the person 
leaves; otherwise it takes the value of 0. The theoretical model is: 
(1) ln( /1 )i i i i iL P P eα βχ= − = + +  
iL = The log of odds ratio 
iP = Probability of a person leaves given characteristics ix  
α = Intercept parameter 
β = The vector of the slope of independent variable coefficients 
iχ = Vector of independent variables 
ie = Error term 
2. Multivariate Probit Regression Models 
In this study, two sets of multivariate probit regression models (each set has three 
separate models) are specified to identify the retention effect of deployment. In the first 
set, the effect of deployment in three separate models is estimated. The first model will 
help to get an idea how deployment affects officers and how its effect differs between the 
periods (pre- and post-GWOT) (The start of GWOT is defined as of March 2003). This 
model is called the ‘General Deployment Model’. The second model will explain whether 
the frequency of deployments has an adverse effect. The last model will account for how 
the duration of the deployments affect retention. The second set of models is organized to 
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understand whether there are differences between two types of deployment: deployments 
to hostile regions vs. non-hostile. Since hostile and non-hostile deployments have 
different characteristics, it is expected that their effects will also be different on officers. 
For the second set, three models are estimated. The first model aims to explain the type of 
deployment. Therefore, hostile and non-hostile deployment variables are added as well as 
the interaction of these two types of deployment with the post-GWOT period. The 
duration of deployment is examined in the second model by adding a variable which 
describes the number of months in each deployment type. The goal of the third model is 
to examine both the frequency and type of deployment. Therefore, an interaction between 
type and number of deployments24 is added to the general deployment model to address 
this issue. Additionally, a post-GWOT variable is added for each deployment model to 
predict the deployment effect for the post-GWOT period. 
3. Model with General Deployment Characteristics 
a. General Deployment Model 
This initial model is used to predict the probability of leaving for those 
who deployed at least once, regardless of type and duration of deployment. The Post-
GWOT variable is added to reflect the difference between cohorts who made the first 
STAY/LEAVE decisions before or after GWOT. DEPLOYED is the variable used to 
identify the deployment. An interaction of DEPLOYED and the Post-GWOT period is 
also included to explain the deployment effect for post-GWOT period. The coefficient of 
this variable provides a difference-in-difference estimation. Equation (2) is the model to 
explain deployment effect.  
(2) =− )1/ln( ii PP β0+β1(FEMALE)+β2(BLACK)+β3(OTHERRACE)+  
β4(HISPANIC)+β5(MARRIED_ WITH_ CHILDREN)+  
β6(SINGLE_ WITH_ CHILDREN)+  
β7(MARRIED_ NO_ CHILDREN)+ 
                                                 
24 The number of deployment variables is determined based on the tabulations in Chapter III. In Table 
12, the number of deployments for each class is presented. 
 47
  Β8(MASTER DEGREE)+ Β9(COMBAT_SERVICE_SUPPORT)+ 
  β10(COMBAT_SUPPORT)+ Β11(DEPLOYED)+ 
  β12(POST_GWOT)+ β13(DEPGWOT)+ 
Where: 
FEMALE=1 if the person is female; =0 otherwise 
BLACK=1 if the person is African American; =0 otherwise 
HISPANIC=1 if the person is Hispanic; =0 otherwise 
OTHER RACE=1 if the person is of other race; =0 otherwise 
MARRIED_ WITH_ CHILDREN=1 if the person is married and has dependents; 
=0 otherwise 
SINGLE_ WITH_ CHILDREN=1 if the person is not married but has dependents; 
=0 otherwise 
MARRIED_ NO_ CHILDREN=1 if the person is married but has no dependents; 
=0 otherwise 
MASTER DEGREE=1 if the person has Master’s Degree or higher; =0 otherwise 
COMBAT_SERVICE_SUPPORT=1 if the person is in one of combat service 
support branch; =0 otherwise 
COMBAT_SUPPORT=1 if the person is in one of combat support branch; =0 
otherwise 
DEPLOYED=1 if the person has ever deployed; =0 otherwise 
POST_GWOT=1 if the person graduated from Academy after 1997; =0 otherwise 
DEPGWOT= The effect of treatment for deployed personnel  




b. Deployment Frequency Model 
Deployment is a part of on-the-job training for soldiers. It helps them to 
get more experience and knowledge without studying tactics and techniques in the 
classroom. Many soldiers would like to experience deployment at least once. Depending 
on their expectations of the future, some may prefer more. Therefore, it is also related to 
the expected utility of the officers. As Hosek and Totten (2002) discussed in their studies, 
the utility goes up to the point where the individual desires additional deployments. For 
this study, it is not expected that a young officer, who is trying to survive in a different 
environment than school, to be fond of frequent deployments at his/her first 5years -- 
although deployment is a good sign for commitment. Table 12 presents the number of 
deployed officers for each graduating class. Based on what Table 12 shows, it was 
decided to categorize the frequency. The reference category was to have no deployment 
and the others were to have one and two or more deployments. Equation (3) is the model 
to account for deployment frequency: 
(3) =− )1/ln( ii PP β0+β1(FEMALE)+β2(BLACK)+β3(OTHER RACE)+  
β4(HISPANIC)+β5(MARRIED_WITH_CHILDREN)+ 
β6(SINGLE_ WITH_ CHILDREN)+  
β7(MARRIED_ NO_ CHILDREN)+ 
  Β8(MASTER DEGREE)+ Β9(COMBAT_SERVICE_SUPPORT)+ 
  β10(COMBAT_SUPPORT)+ β11(POST_GWOT)+ 
  β12(DEPLOY_1)+ β13(DEPLOY_2MORE)+ 
  β14(DEPLOY_1GWOT)+ β15(DEPLOY_2MOREGWOT) 
Where: 
DEPLOY_1=1 if the person deployed only once; =0 otherwise 
DEPLOY_2MORE=1 if the person deployed twice or more; =0 otherwise 
DEPLOY_1GWOT= The effect of GWOT for deployed once 
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   (=DEPLOY_1 * Post-GWOT) 
DEPLOY_2MOREGWOT= The effect of GWOT for deployed twice or more; 
 =0 otherwise (=DEPLOY2_MORE * Post-GWOT) 
c. Deployment Duration Model 
 Duration is another indicator that may have a significant effect on the 
decision to leave. Based on results of tabulations in Chapter III, three categories of 
duration were created. The base case is to have no experience on deployment. The other 
categories are “being deployed 1 to 15 months” and “deployed more than 15 months.” 
Also included is the interaction of these variables with post-GWOT variable to allocate 
the effect of period. Equation (4) is the model account for deployment duration. 
(4) =− )1/ln( ii PP β0+β1(FEMALE)+β2(BLACK)+β3(OTHER RACE)+  
β4(HISPANIC)+β5(MARRIED_ WITH_ CHILDREN)+  
β6(SINGLE_ WITH_ CHILDREN)+  
β7(MARRIED_ NO_ CHILDREN)+ 
  Β8(MASTER DEGREE)+ Β9(COMBAT_SERVICE_SUPPORT)+ 
  β10(COMBAT_SUPPORT)+ β12(POST_GWOT)+ 
  β13(DEPLOY_15)+ β15(DEPLOY_15MORE)+ 
  β16(DEPLOY_15GWOT)+ β17(DEPLOY_15MOREGWOT) 
Where: 
DEPLOY_15=1 if the person experienced 1 to 15 months of deployment; 
 =0 otherwise 
DEPLOY_15MORE=1 if the person experienced more than 15 months of  
Deployment; =0 otherwise 
DEPLOY_15GWOT= The effect of GWOT for deployments up to 15 months 
  (= DEPLOY_15 * Post-GWOT) 
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DEPLOY_15MOREGWOT= The effect of GWOT for deployments more than  
15 months (= DEPLOY_15MORE * Post-GWOT) 
4. Models for Hostile versus Non-hostile Deployment 
a. General Hostile Deployment Model 
 The difference between hostile and non-hostile deployment will have 
different effects on individuals. Besides these two groups, individuals who experience 
both types might also be expected to behave differently at the end of the initial service 
obligation point. Because of this, a combination of these two types is also added to 
Equation (5):  
(5) =− )1/ln( ii PP β0+β1(FEMALE)+β2(BLACK)+β3(OTHER RACE)+  
β4(HISPANIC)+β5(MARRIED_ WITH_ CHILDREN)+  
β6(SINGLE_ WITH_ CHILDREN)+  
β7(MARRIED_ NO_ CHILDREN)+ 
  Β8(MASTER DEGREE)+ Β9(COMBAT_SERVICE_SUPPORT)+ 
  β10(COMBAT_SUPPORT)+ 
β11(POST_GWOT)+Β12(ONHOSTILE)+ 
  Β13(ONNONHOS)+ Β14(HOS_NONHOS)+ 
  Β15(ONHOSTILEGWOT)+ Β16(ONNONHOSGWOT) + 
  Β17(BOTHGWOT) 
Where: 
ONHOSTILE=1 if the person is deployed at least once to only a hostile area;  
=0 otherwise 
ONNONHOS=1 if the person is deployed at least once to only a non-hostile area;  
 =0 otherwise 
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HOS_NONHOS= 1 if the person is deployed both to hostile and non-hostile area; 
 =0 otherwise 
ONHOSTILEGWOT= The effect of GWOT for hostile deployment 
 (= ONHOSTILE * Post-GWOT) 
ONNONHOSGWOT= The effect of GWOT for non-hostile deployment 
 (= ONNONHOS * Post-GWOT) 
BOTHGWOT= The effect of GWOT for both deployment type 
 (= HOS_NONHOS * Post-GWOT) 
b. Hostile Deployment Duration Model 
 When analyzing the duration of deployment, three categories are created. 
An interaction of type and duration of deployment is also added to account for the 
treatment for post-GWOT period. Equation (6) shows the effect of duration of 
deployment on retention rate. 
(6) =− )1/ln( ii PP β0+β1(FEMALE)+β2(BLACK)+β3(OTHER RACE)+  
β4(HISPANIC)+β5(MARRIED_ WITH_ CHILDREN)+  
β6(SINGLE_ WITH_ CHILDREN)+  
β7(MARRIED_ NO_ CHILDREN)+ 
  Β8(MASTER DEGREE)+ Β9(COMBAT_SERVICE_SUPPORT)+ 
  β10(COMBAT_SUPPORT)+ β19(POST_GWOT)+ Β11(HOS_15)+ 
  Β12(HOS_15MORE)+ Β13(NONHOS_15) 
  Β14(NONHOS_15MORE)+β15(HOS_15GWOT)  
  Β16(HOS15MOREGWOT)+β17(NONHOS_15GWOT)  
  Β18(NONHOS15MOREGWOT) 
Where: 
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HOS_15=1 if the person has served in a hostile area for 1 to 15 months;  
=0 otherwise 
HOS_15MORE=1 if the person has served in a hostile area more than 15 months;  
=0 otherwise 
NONHOS_15=1 if the person has served in a non-hostile area for 1 to 15 months;  
=0 otherwise 
NONHOS_15MORE=1 if the person has served in a non-hostile area more than  
15 months; =0 otherwise 
HOS_15GWOT= The effect of GWOT for those who have served between 1-15  
Months in hostile area (=HOS_15 * Post-GWOT) 
HOS_15MOREGWOT= The effect of GWOT for those who have served more  
Than 15 months in hostile area (=HOS_15MORE * Post-GWOT) 
NONHOS_15GWOT= The effect of GWOT for those who have served between  
1-15 months in non-hostile area 
(=NONHOS_15* Post-GWOT) 
NONHOS_15MOREGWOT= The effect of GWOT for those who have served  
More than 15 months in non-hostile area 
(= NONHOS_15MORE * Post-GWOT) 
c. Hostile Deployment Frequency Model 
 As discussed in the Chapter III, another possible reason for separation 
might be the frequency of deployments which an officer experienced in the first 5 years. 
The general expectation when graduating from the Academy is to experience one 
deployment until the end of 5th year. However, the preliminary data analysis showed that 
some officers have higher number of deployments than many of their peers. As a result of  
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these preliminary findings, Equation (7) below is analyzed to understand whether the 
frequency of deployment for two types of deployment is associated with recent retention 
behavior: 
(7) =− )1/ln( ii PP β0+β1(FEMALE)+β2(BLACK)+β3(OTHER RACE)+  
β4(HISPANIC)+β5(MARRIED_ WITH_ CHILDREN)+  
β6(SINGLE_ WITH_ CHILDREN)+  
β7(MARRIED_ NO_ CHILDREN)+ 
  Β8(MASTER DEGREE)+ Β9(COMBAT_SERVICE_SUPPORT)+ 
  β10(COMBAT_SUPPORT)+β11(POST_GWOT)+ Β12(HOSTILE1)+ 
  Β13(HOSTILE_1MORE)+ Β14(NHOSTILE1) 
  Β15(NHOSTILE_1MORE)+β16(HOS1_GWOT) 
  Β17(HOS1MORE_GWOT)+ Β18(NHOS1_GWOT) 
  Β19(NHOS1MORE_GWOT)+ 
Where: 
HOSTILE1= 1 If the person experienced 1 deployment; =0 otherwise 
HOSTILE_1MORE= 1 If the person experienced more than 1 deployment; =0  
   otherwise 
NHOSTILE1= 1 If the person experienced 1 deployment; =0 otherwise 
NHOSTILE_1MORE= 1 If the person experienced more than 1 deployment; =0  
   otherwise 
HOS1_GWOT= The effect of treatment for 1 hostile deployment 
  (= HOSTILE1 * Post-GWOT) 
HOS1MORE_GWOT= The effect of treatment for hostile deployments more  
than 1 (= HOSTILE_1MORE * Post-GWOT) 
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NHOS1_GWOT= The effect of treatment for 1 non-hostile deployment 
  (= NHOSTILE1 * Post-GWOT) 
NHOS1MORE_GWOT= The effect of treatment for non-hostile deployments  
more than 1 (= NHOSTILE_1MORE * Post-GWOT) 
B. IDENTIFICATION OF VARIABLES 
1. Explanatory Variables 
In this analysis, three groups of explanatory variables are used to explain the 
retention behavior of Academy graduates: deployment-related, demographic and service 
characteristics. 
a. Deployment Variables 
(1) Deployment indicator (DEPLOYED, NOT_DEPLOYED). 
Previous studies discuss both the desirable and undesirable aspects of deployment. In 
general, three desirable aspects of deployment are commonly identified. In the first place, 
deployment is believed to distinguish the officer from his/her peers and trigger early 
promotion for the ones who are eager to serve overseas. Since the Army wants to create a 
difference between deployers and non-deployers, it prefers to use early promotion as a 
tool to motivate its officers to serve more frequently and effectively in overseas locations. 
Secondly, additional monthly payments for deployers and savings due to the nature of 
deployment constitute the monetary side of the issue. For example, a person who 
deployed to Iraq for a year gets an additional payment of approximately $3,000 ($225 
hostile fire pay for each month). Since in most cases living in quarters and working 7/24 
in a deployment zone requires few expenditures, the same person can save a large portion 
of the additional pay. This also depends on the dependency status of the person. If he/she 
is married, the savings might be much less than they are for a single person. Finally, 
some officers see deployment as a valuable experience for them and believe that it takes 
them out of their daily routine and involves them in the operational aspects of the 
military. 
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On the other hand, as undesirable aspects, officers are separated 
from their families for a period and might miss some job-related opportunities. 
Specifically, deployment might be an obstacle for a young LT completing his/her 
Master’s Degree at the earliest possible time. At the same time, in some cases for some 
officers, personal expectations might turn into a disadvantage. Officers who graduate 
from a highly selective university might expect to earn a higher quality of life as 
compared to his/her peers in the civilian market. As a result, although previous studies 
discussed in Chapter II mention a balance between positive and neutral effects of 
deployment on retention, this study expects to observe a positive correlation between 
DEPLOYED and LEAVE variables. NON_DEPLOYED is used as the base group and 
includes the binary DEPLOYED variable in the general deployment model. 
   (2) Deployment Location Indicator (NOT DEPLOYED, 
ONHOSTILE, ONNONHOSTILE, HOS_NONHOS). This study categorizes the 
deployments into four groups. These are “having no deployment,” “having only one 
hostile deployment,” “having only non-hostile deployment,” and “having both types of 
deployment.” Hostile and non-hostile deployments have different characteristics. More 
commonly, in hostile deployments, individuals expect to serve in more hazardous 
locations and to take more risks as compared to non-hostile locations. Therefore, it is 
expected that each has different effects on the decision to leave. Due to the nature of 
hostile deployments, this study expects ONHOSTILE and HOS_NONHOS to have 
higher negative effects on retention. The base group is NOT DEPLOYED. In addition to 
all three categories, interactions of these three variables are used in the model to discuss 
the effect of treatment. 
   (3) Deployment Duration Indicator (DEPLOY_0, 
DEPLOY_15, DEPLOY_15MORE, HOS_0, HOS_15, HOS_15MORE, NONHOS_0, 
NONHOS_15, NONHOS_15MORE). Considering the tabulations (Tables 10 and 11) in 
Chapter III, this study noticed that the duration of both hostile and non-hostile 
deployments tripled in the post-GWOT period. This increase is observed not only for 
hostile, but also for non-hostile deployments. Based on the main hypothesis, as 
deployment gets longer it is expected for officers to have less desire to serve. Because of 
 56
that, this study believes there is a positive correlation between both months in hostile and 
non-hostile zones and the dependent variable (LEAVE). Three categories are generated to 
explain duration effect. These are DEPLOY_0, DEPLOY_15, and DEPLOY_15MORE. 
The base case is DEPLOY_0 which describes no deployment experience. For the second 
set of models (to compare differences between hostile and non-hostile deployment), six 
more variables are generated and added to the fifth model (Equation (6)) in the second 
set. The base cases for this model are HOS_0 and NONHOS_0. 
   (4) Deployment Frequency Indicator (NOT_DEPLOYED, 
DEPLOY1, DEPLOY_2MORE, NO_HOSTILE, HOSTILE1, HOS1_MORE, NHOSTILE1, 
NONHOSTILE1_MORE) .Tables in Chapter III indicated that as deployment got longer 
in the previous years, it also become more frequent. The frequency distribution presented 
in Table 13 also shows that the number of officers with more than one deployment in the 
first 5 years has increased dramatically. Therefore, this study expects a positive 
correlation between the frequency indicator variables and the dependent variable 
(LEAVE). 
  (5) Interactions of deployment variables with Post-GWOT. 
These variables are generated by interacting the post-GWOT variable and deployment 
variables. They are used to identify the effect of Global War on Terror. A detailed 
explanation of these interaction variables is provided in Table 16. 
Variable Model Used Interaction Definition 
DEPGWOT Model 1 (Equation 2) =DEPLOYED * Post-GWOT =1 if the person is both deployed 
and in the post-GWOT group; 0 
otherwise 
DEPLOY_1GWOT Model 2 (Equation 3) =DEPLOY_1 * Post-GWOT =1 if the person is both deployed 
once and in the post-GWOT 
group; 0 otherwise 
DEPLOY_2MOREGWOT Model 2 (Equation 3) = DEPLOY_2MORE * Post-GWOT =1 if the person is both deployed 
more than once and in post-
GWOT group; 0 otherwise 
DEPLOY_15GWOT Model 3 (Equation 4) = DEPLOY_15 * Post-GWOT =1 if the person is both deployed 
for 1 to 15 months totally and in 
post-GWOT group; 0 otherwise 
DEPLOY_15MOREGWOT Model 3 (Equation 4) = DEPLOY_15MORE * Post-GWOT =1 if the person is both deployed 
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more than 15 months totally and 
in post-GWOT group; 0 
otherwise 
ONHOSTILEGWOT Model 4 (Equation 5) = ONHOSTILE * Post-GWOT =1 if the person is both deployed 
only to hostile areas and in the 
post-GWOT; 0 otherwise  
ONNONHOSGWOT Model 4 (Equation 5) = ONNONHOS * Post-GWOT =1 if the person is both deployed 
only to non-hostile areas and in 
the post-GWOT group; 0 
otherwise 
BOTHGWOT Model 4 (Equation 5) = HOS_NONHOS * Post-GWOT =1 if the person experienced both 
type of deployments and in the 
post-GWOT group; 0 otherwise 
HOS_15GWOT Model 5 (Equation 6) = HOS_15 * Post-GWOT =1 if the person is deployed 
hostile areas 1 to 15 months 
totally and in the post-GWOT 
group; 0 otherwise 
HOS15MOREGWOT Model 5 (Equation 6) = HOS_15MORE * Post-GWOT =1 if the person is deployed 
hostile areas more than 15 
months totally and in the post-
GWOT group; 0 otherwise 
NONHOS_15GWOT Model 5 (Equation 6) = NONHOS_15 * Post-GWOT =1 if the person is deployed non-
hostile areas 1 to 15 months and 
in the post-GWOT group; 0 
otherwise 
NONHOS15MOREGWOT Model 5 (Equation 6) = NONHOS_15MORE * Post-GWOT =1 if the person is deployed non-
hostile areas more than 15 
months and in the post-GWOT 
group; 0 otherwise 
HOS_1GWOT Model 6 (Equation 7) = HOSTILE1 * Post-GWOT =1 if the person is deployed 
hostile area once and in the post-
GWOT group, 0 otherwise 
HOS1MORE_GWOT Model 6 (Equation 7) = HOSTILE_1MORE * Post-GWOT =1 if the person is deployed 
hostile areas more than once and 
in the post-GWOT group; 0 
otherwise 
NHOS1_GWOT Model 6 (Equation 7) = NHOSTILE1 * Post-GWOT =1 if the person is deployed non-
hostile area once and in the post-
GWOT group; 0 otherwise 
NHOS1MORE_GWOT Model 6 (Equation 7) = NHOSTILE_1MORE * Post-GWOT =1 if the person is deployed non-
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hostile area more than once and 
in the post-GWOT group; 0 
otherwise 
Source: Interactions of DMDC data 
Table 16.   Interactions of Deployment Variables 
 
b.  Demographic Variables 
(1) Gender (MALE, FEMALE). USMA started to accept female 
cadets in 1976 and, since then, roughly 15% - 17% of freshmen have been females. Based 
on Academy regulations, they are obliged to follow the same academic and military 
program as their male classmates, except they follow different standards on physical 
training tests. Although combat specialties were also opened to females previously, 
currently women can only serve in combat support and combat service support 
specialties. Women serve almost everywhere in the world and have the same 
opportunities for career progression as their male counterparts. Even though these 
equalities for men and women officers have been effective for so long, historically the 
military has always been male-dominated. This reality negatively affects the morale and 
motivation of female officers and perhaps reduces their desire to remain in the Army. 
Because of this reason, this study expects to find a positive correlation between FEMALE 
and LEAVE in the results. The base gender is selected as MALE for this study. The 
gender variable is FEMALE and it is binary. 
  (2) Race/Ethnicity (WHITE, BLACK, HISPANIC, 
OTHER_RACE, OTHER_ETHNIC). This study expects to have negative correlation 
between the variables of BLACK, OTHER_RACE, HISPANIC and LEAVE (dependent 
variable). WHITE and OTHER_ETHNIC variables will be used as the base group. All of 
the race and ethnicity variables are binary. If the member belongs to that group, it takes 
the value of 1; 0 otherwise. 
  (3) Marriage and Dependency Status (SINGLE NO 
CHILDREN, SINGLE_ WITH_ CHILDREN, MARRIED_ WITH_ CHILDREN, 
MARRIED_ NO_ CHILDREN). This study categorizes marriage and dependency status 
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into four dimensions. The base case is being both single and having no children (SINGLE 
NO CHILDREN). Other categories are SINGLE_ WITH_ CHILDREN (single with 
children), MARRIED_ WITH_ CHILDREN (married and having children), and 
MARRIED_ NO_ CHILDREN (married and no children). The focus group includes 
officers who are eligible to make a STAY/LEAVE decision at their 5th year. Five years 
after graduation is a short period of time for the officers who focus just on their early 
careers. This study believes that the primary goal of these officers in the early years of 
their career is either to get early promotions and progress in their careers or to get 
additional education and prepare themselves for the future. One can hypothesize that if 
the member is married and has dependents, his probability to stay increases. Looking for 
jobs in the civilian market requires time and effort and results sometimes in 
unemployment for a long period. The risk of being unemployed for a long period may 
induce them to stay in the military. 
On the other hand, the principles of Labor Economics (Ehrenberg 
and Smith, 2006) state that people look for a more stable life. When there are dependents, 
the civilian market commonly provides this.  Therefore, one might expect to see some 
officers prefer to leave early in order to enjoy more of this stability. Specifically, in 
recent years, due to an increase in the number of deployments, family life has become a 
big issue for service members. This study expects to see a negative correlation between 
MARRIED_ WITH_ CHILDREN, MARRIED_ NO_ CHILDREN, SINGLE_ WITH_ 
CHILDREN and retention (LEAVE) variable in the results.  
  (4)  Education (BA, MASTER DEGREE). MASTER DEGREE 
is binary and the Baccalaureate Degree is the base group. Officers graduate from the 
Academy with a Baccalaureate Degree at the end of 4 years. Not all, but some, can find 
opportunities to attain more education in the early years of their career. Some of the 
programs after graduation are funded by the Army; some are not. In most cases, those 
who follow funded programs are required to serve additional years on top of their initial 
service obligation. Since this thesis only looks at the 5-year point for all officers after 
graduation, graduates of funded programs are not within the scope of this thesis. Officers 
who attain Master or Doctorate Degrees by attending collages other than Army funded 
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programs spend both their money and leisure time to gain additional education. The 
reason for this effort might be to increase the probability of finding better jobs in the 
civilian market. As discussed by Ehrenberg and Smith (2007), investments in human 
capital are generally done by future-oriented people and these investments yield higher 
earnings in the future. Therefore, this thesis assumes that officers who attain higher 
degrees in the early years of their career are more likely to leave when their obligation is 
over. As a result of this, this study expects to have a positive correlation between 
MASTER DEGREE and LEAVE variable in the results.  
c.  Service Characteristics 
(1) Military specialties (COMBAT, COMBAT_SUPPORT, 
COMBAT_SERVICE_SUPPORT). The base group for this characteristic is COMBAT 
which identifies the people who are in combat specialties. COMBAT_SUPPORT and 
COMBAT_SERVICE_SUPPORT are the variables included in the models. Specialties in 
the Army are categorized in three main groups in the analysis. These are combat 
specialties, combat support specialties, and combat service support specialties. The 
specialties in each group are presented in Table 17. Each specialty has its unique 
characteristics and environment. Some require more field work, while others require 
more staff work. Not only the characteristics, but also the number of billets, are different 
for each specialty. Some specialties, especially in combat service support, have only a 
few billets in hazardous locations while others have many. Therefore, this thesis does not 
expect every specialty to have equal deployment experiences. Generally, deployment 
experiences for combat specialty officers are more likely than for other specialties. In 
contrast, there are differences between specialties in the availability of jobs in the civilian 
sector. Most commonly the technical branches, such as electronic, chemical, and finance, 
have had better jobs opportunities in the outside market. This can be counted as a 
negative factor for retention of combat service support personnel. Consequently, even 
though the possibility of finding jobs creates negative effects on combat service support 
officers, the combat specialties are the ones which bear the burden of deployments and, 
as a result, all expected to have lower retention rates 
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Air Defense Artillery 5.12% 
Armor 13.02% 
Aviation 12.41% 
Corps of Engineers 11.93% 






Chemical Corps 4.29% 
Military Intelligence 2.70% 
Military Police 5.28% 
 
Combat Support Arms 
Signal 0.34% 













Table 17.   Army Branches and Proportion Represented in the Dataset 
 
2. Dependent Variable (LEAVE) 
The dependent variable (LEAVE) is binary. It takes a value of 1 if the officer 
leaves the Army after his/her initial decision point at the fifth year point. It takes a value 
of 0 if he/she stays beyond the fifth year.  
C. SUMMARY 
The purpose of this chapter is to present the models and definition of variables 
utilized in the six different models employed in the study. The first one is the General 
Deployment Model which aims to distinguish the effect of deployment between the pre- 
and post-GWOT period. Additional models are generated to reflect the effect of type, 
frequency, and duration of deployment. LEAVE is used as the dependent variable for all 
models. Demographic, military, and deployment characteristics are the elements used to 
account for recent retention rates. The type and expected effects of each explanatory 
variable is summarized in Table 18 to provide a quick overview of the chapter. 
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Variable Name Variable Type Expected Sign 
DEPLOYMENT VARIABLES   
Deployment Indicator   
NOT_DEPLOYED Binary Base Case 
DEPLOYED Binary + 
Deployment Location Indicator   
NOT_DEPLOYED Binary Base Case 
ONHOSTILE Binary + 
ONNONHOSTILE Binary + 
HOS_NONHOS Binary + 
Deployment Duration Indicator   
DEPLOY_0 Binary Base Case 
DEPLOY_15 Binary + 
DEPLOY_15MORE Binary + 
HOS_0 Binary Base Case 
HOS_15 Binary + 
HOS_15MORE Binary + 
NONHOS_0 Binary Base Case 
NONHOS_15 Binary + 
NONHOS_15MORE Binary + 
Deployment Frequency Indicator   
NOT_DEPLOYED Binary Base Case 
DEPLOY_1 Binary + 
DEPLOY_2MORE Binary + 
NO_HOSTILE Binary Base Case 
HOSTILE1 Binary + 
HOSTILE_1MORE Binary + 
NO_NONHOSTILE Binary Base Case 
NHOSTILE1 Binary + 
NHOSTILE_1MORE Binary + 
GWOT Indicator   
PRE_GWOT Binary Base Case 
POST_GWOT Binary + 
Interaction variables   
DEPGWOT Binary + 
DEPLOY_1GWOT Binary + 
DEPLOY_2MOREGWOT Binary + 
DEPLOY_15GWOT Binary + 
DEPLOY_15MOREGWOT Binary + 
ONHOSTILEGWOT Binary + 
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ONNONHOSGWOT Binary + 
BOTHGWOT Binary + 
HOS_15GWOT Binary + 
HOS15MOREGWOT Binary + 
NONHOS_15GWOT Binary + 
NONHOS15MOREGWOT Binary + 
HOS1_GWOT Binary + 
HOS1MORE_GWOT Binary + 
NHOS1_GWOT Binary + 
NHOS1MORE_GWOT Binary + 
DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES   
Gender   
Male Binary Base Case 
Female Binary + 
Race   
Other Race Binary Base Case 
OTHER RACE Binary + 
Black Binary - 
Other Ethnic Binary Base Case 
Hispanic Binary - 
Marital/Dependency Status   
SIN_NOCH Binary Base Case 
SINGLE_ WITH_ CHILDREN Binary - 
MARRIED_ NO_ CHILDREN Binary - 
MARRIED_ WITH_ CHILDREN Binary - 
Education   
BA Binary Base Case 
MASTER DEGREE Binary + 
MILITARY VARIABLES   
Military Specialty   
COMBAT Binary Base Case 
COMBAT_SUPPORT Binary - 
COMBAT_SERVICE_SUPPORT Binary - 
Source: Author 
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V. MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS RESULTS 
A.  OVERVIEW 
In this study, the primary goal was to find whether there is an association between 
demographic, service, deployment characteristics, and the decision to LEAVE at the end 
of the initial active duty service obligation for Academy graduates. The analysis dataset, 
requested from DMDC sources, consisted of three dataset files: Officer Master File, 
Active Duty Pay File, and Separation File. In addition to the DMDC variables, which 
were already in the dataset, a few interaction variables were created which allowed 
analysis of the effect of deployments for post-GWOT period.  
The final dataset consisted of 6,385 observations after leaving out aviation 
officers (who have longer ADSO than other Army branches). Preliminary analysis 
presented in Chapter III gave insight into the effect of deployment. This study observed 
that the classes after 1997 have experienced longer and more frequent deployments 
compared to the previous four classes and the separation rate after ADSO for these 
classes are also much higher. Based on both this thesis’ main hypothesis and the 
preliminary findings, this study created six probit models to test and analyze to see if the 
evidence on deployment effect is accurate. All models included the same demographic 
and military variables, but differed in the included deployment variables. To investigate 
for the difference between the two periods (pre-GWOT and post-GWOT), difference-in-
difference estimation was used by adding interaction of post-GWOT and each 
deployment variable. Estimation results and accuracy of the models were tested by 
looking at Chow, likelihood-ratio, and pseudo-R square tests. The purpose of this chapter 
is to analyze and assess the results of regression models and present final findings. 
B. NOTIONAL PERSON (BASE CASE) 
In this study, the notional person is male, white, non-Hispanic, is single, with no 
dependents, has a Baccalaureate Degree, and is serving or served in combat arms. For 
deployment characteristics, the notional person is never deployed and is a member of pre-
GWOT classes (1994, 1995, 1996, and 1997). 
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C. MODELS WITH GENERAL DEPLOYMENT CHARACTERISTICS 
Three models are estimated to analyze the determinants of retention behavior of 
Academy graduates. The main model, called the “General Deployment Model,” tries to 
explain whether “being deployed” is a significant determinant and whether, over time, 
there is a change in this determinant. The second model focuses on the effect of frequent 
deployments in addition to the effect of the main military and demographic 
characteristics. The third model is an alternative aspect of deployment which concentrates 
on duration. The post-GWOT variable and interactions between different deployment 
variables and the post-GWOT dummy are added for the difference-in-difference 
estimations. Table 19 presents results of these three models. For all models, marginal 
effects are presented instead of using the probit coefficient to provide an easy 
interpretation for the reader. (The results of full probit estimation models are provided in 
the Appendix) (See Table 16 for description of deployment variables) 





(3) Deployment Duration 
Model 
 
FEMALE 0.009 0.010 0.009 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
BLACK -0.084*** -0.083*** -0.084*** 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
OTHER_RACE -0.050** -0.050** -0.050** 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
HISPANIC -0.019 -0.020 -0.019 
 (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) 
MARRIED_ WITH_ CHILDREN -0.105*** -0.106*** -0.106*** 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
SINGLE_ WITH_ CHILDREN -0.117*** -0.117*** -0.117*** 
 (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) 
MARRIED_ NO_ CHILDREN -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 
 (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) 
MASTER DEGREE -0.321*** -0.321*** -0.321*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 0.034* 0.034* 0.033* 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
COMBAT SUPPORT 0.060*** 0.059*** 0.059*** 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
postGWOT -0.096*** -0.097*** -0.097*** 
 (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) 
DEPLOYED 0.094***   
 (0.020)   
DEPGWOT 0.145***   
 (0.037)   
DEPLOY_1  0.073**  
  (0.029)  
DEPLOY_2MORE  0.107***  
  (0.022)  
DEPLOY_1GWOT  0.168***  
  (0.050)  
DEPLOY_2MOREGWOT  0.138***  
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  (0.039)  
DEPLOY_15   0.098*** 
   (0.022) 
DEPLOY_15MORE   0.107*** 
   (0.038) 
DEPLOY_15GWOT   0.153*** 
   (0.042) 
DEPLOY15MOREGWOT   0.141*** 
   (0.051) 
Pseudo R2 0.0827 0.0831 0.0827 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Predicted probability of separation 0.3325 0.3325 0.3325 
Probability of separation 0.3556 0.3556 0.3556 
Observations 6385 6385 6385 
Standard errors in parentheses    
* significant at 10%; ** significant 
at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
   
Table 19.   Estimated Marginal Effects for Separation Models with General Deployment 
Characteristics 
1. Interpretation of Demographic and Military Variables  
Results indicate that gender (FEMALE) is not a key factor in the decision to 
leave. Although the coefficient has the expected sign, it is not statistically significant. 
Contrarily, race seems to have a significant effect on separation. African Americans and 
other minorities are more likely to stay after the 5th year compared to whites. An African 
American is 8.4% points and an officer from ‘other’ races is 5% points less likely to 
leave the Army compared to a white officer.  
Marriage and dependency status was another factor that this study tried to explain 
while considering the decision to leave. Compared to the base case, which describes a 
single officer with no dependents, a married officer with dependents is 10.5% points less 
likely to leave. Surprisingly, this study found a positive relationship between separation 
and being single with dependents. It looks like, besides marriage, dependency status is 
also a key factor that affects an officer’s separation decision.  
For the effect of education, it was observed that not many people had a chance to 
attain higher degrees in their first 5 years. It was obvious that there was a general 
downward trend in advanced degrees during the post-GWOT period. Table 9 shows that 
16.07% of the sample has completed at least a Master’s Degree. Although it was 
expected that observation would show a positive correlation between MASTER 
DEGREE and separation, the result was the opposite. An officer with a Master or higher 
degree is 32% points less likely to leave compared to base case. As discussed in Chapter 
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IV, since the dataset did not provide the educational attainments for the first 5 years of all 
cohorts, it cannot be concluded that the coefficient of MASTER DEGREE reflects the 
truth. In other words, it is natural that an officer in pre-GWOT period is observed for a 
longer time interval than an officer in post-GWOT period; thus, there is a higher 
probability to attain a Master’s Degree. 
Among the three military specialty categories for the Army, this study selected 
combat arms as the base case. It was expected that officers in combat support and combat 
service support specialties would, after the initial point, have higher probabilities to stay. 
In contrast to expectations, combat support and combat service support specialties are 
more likely to leave the Army at the initial point. Compared to combat arm officers, 
officers in combat support branches are 6% points and officers in combat service support 
branches are 3.4% points more likely to leave.  
2. Interpretation of Deployment Variables  
In the first model, deployment is one of the key determinants of the decision to 
leave. An officer who deployed at least once has a probability of leaving the Army at the 
initial point that is 9.4% points higher than officers with no deployment experiences. The 
sign and magnitude of the coefficient is not the same for the post-GWOT variable which 
identifies whether an officer is a member of any graduating class between 1998 and 2001. 
The result indicates that an officer in the post-GWOT period is more likely to stay 
compared to the pre-GWOT period (regardless of deployment status). Finally, an 
interaction of these two key variables provides significant evidence that deployed officers 
in the post-GWOT period are more likely to leave the Army. An officer who deployed 
and in the post-GWOT period has a probability to leave the Army that is 14.5% points 
higher than officers in the base group. The interaction variable DEPGWOT indicates that 
deployments that occurred in the post-GWOT period had greater negative effects on 
retention relative to the pre-GWOT period. DEPGWOT has a positive coefficient and is 
statistically significant.  
The second model tried to explain the effect of frequent deployments on retention. 
Therefore, officers are categorized as “never deployed,” “deployed once,” and “deployed 
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twice.” It was expected the effects of these variables (DEPLOY_1 and 
DEPLOY_2MORE) to be positive on separation. The magnitude of the effect should 
increase as the number of deployments increased. The interaction of these variables was 
added with the post-GWOT variable to identify the possible effect of the post-GWOT 
period. The base case was “never deployed” for the model. Results indicated that there 
are significant differences between the three categories. An officer who deployed once is 
7.3% points more likely to leave relative to base group. Additionally, the probability of 
leaving increases to 10.7% points for an officer who experienced two or more 
deployments. Besides these results, interactions also indicated that an officer in the post-
GWOT period was more likely to leave relative to an officer in pre-GWOT period. The 
coefficient of the interaction of DEPLOY_1 with post-GWOT shows that there is a 
16.8% point difference between two periods. However, the magnitude of the coefficient 
is 13.8% for DEPLOY_2MORE interaction. This suggests that the effect of deployment 
is similar regardless of frequency. 
In the third model, as an alternative to deployment frequency, duration effect on 
deployment was analyzed. Similar to the frequency model, three categories for duration 
were created as well. The base case was again to be ‘never deployed’. Other categories 
identified officers who deployed ‘1 to 15’ or ‘more than 15 months’ of deployment. The 
results provide evidence that as deployment gets longer, it increases the probability to 
leave. However, the magnitude of the coefficients for both DEPLOY_15 and 
DEPLOY_15MORE are similar. Interaction of these variables to search for treatment 
effect also indicates that the duration does not matter much for an officer in the post-







D. MODELS FOR HOSTILE VERSUS NON-HOSTILE DEPLOYMENTS  
 (1)General 












Frequency Model  
 
FEMALE 0.009 0.008 0.006 0.006 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
BLACK -0.084*** -0.085*** -0.087*** -0.085*** 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
OTHER_RACE -0.050** -0.049** -0.047** -0.048** 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
HISPANIC -0.019 -0.019 -0.018 -0.020 
 (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) 
MARRIED_ WITH_ 
CHILDREN 
-0.105*** -0.115*** -0.115*** -0.109*** 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) 
MARRIED_ NO_ 
CHILDREN 
-0.010 -0.013 -0.009 -0.009 
 (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) 
SINGLE_ WITH_ 
CHILDREN 
-0.117*** -0.125*** -0.122*** -0.119*** 
 (0.040) (0.039) (0.039) (0.040) 
MASTER DEGREE -0.321*** -0.321*** -0.322*** -0.321*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
COMSERV 0.034* 0.033* 0.032 0.034* 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
COMBSUP 0.060*** 0.059*** 0.065*** 0.061*** 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
PostGWOT -0.096*** -0.097*** -0.083*** -0.082*** 
 (0.035) (0.035) (0.029) (0.029) 
DEPLOYED 0.094***    
 (0.020)    
DEPGWOT 0.145***    
 (0.037)    
ONHOSTILE  0.077**   
  (0.033)   
ONNONHOS  0.122***   
  (0.030)   
HOS_NONHOS  0.099***   
  (0.023)   
ONHOSTILEGWOT  0.031   
  (0.055)   
ONNONHOSGWOT  0.167***   
  (0.051)   
BOTHGWOT  0.156***   
  (0.040)   
HOS_15   0.016  
   (0.019)  
HOS_15MORE   0.051  
   (0.070)  
NONHOS_15   0.072***  
   (0.019)  
NONHOS_15MORE   -0.036  
   (0.088)  
HOS15GWOT   0.018  
   (0.030)  
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HOS15MOREGWOT   -0.115*  
   (0.062)  
NONHOS15GWOT   0.145***  
   (0.033)  
NONHOS15MOREGWOT   0.238**  
   (0.106)  
HOSTILE1    -0.017 
    (0.023) 
HOSTILE1_MORE    0.043* 
    (0.023) 
NHOSTILE1    0.073*** 
    (0.022) 
NHOSTILE1_MORE    0.058** 
    (0.025) 
HOS1_GWOT    0.041 
    (0.037) 
HOS1MORE_GWOT    -0.031 
    (0.032) 
NHOS1_GWOT    0.145*** 
    (0.036) 
NHOS1MORE_GWOT    0.141*** 
    (0.040) 
Observations 6385 6385 6385 6385 
Predicted probability of 
separation 
0.3325 0.3325 0.3325 0.3325 
Probability of separation 0.3556 0.3556 0.3556 0.3556 
Pseudo R2 0.0827 0.0854 0.0869 0.0849 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Standard errors in 
parentheses 
    
* significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1% 
    
Table 20.   Marginal Effects for Hostile and Non-hostile Deployment Separation Models 
 
In models (4) to (6), I differentiate deployment type into deployments to hostile 
and non-hostile regions. For the fourth model, three new variables, which identify two 
kinds of deployment and a combination of both, were added. Interaction variables were 
also helpful to analyze the post-GWOT period effect. The base case for this model was 
‘not being deployed.’ Results indicated that all three variables affected positively the 
decision to leave. Surprisingly, the effect of non-hostile deployment is higher than hostile 
deployment. As discussed in Chapter IV, it was expected that hostile deployments would 
have the longer effect since they are more tough and dangerous. An officer who deployed 
in only hostile areas is 7% points more likely to leave compared to base case. In contrast 
to expectations, this probability increases up to 12% points for an officer who has 
experienced only non-hostile missions. Besides that, when the post-GWOT effect was 
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analyzed, an officer who has experienced only non-hostile missions in the post-GWOT 
period is more likely (16.7% points) to leave relative to an officer in the pre-GWOT 
period. Results indicated that both hostile and non-hostile deployments negatively affect 
the decision to stay. Further, non-hostile deployments have greater effects on this 
decision compared to hostile deployments. The results also show that non-hostile 
deployments in the post-GWOT period have greater effect on the decision to leave than 
these in the pre-GWOT period. (See Table 16 for description of deployment variables) 
For the fifth model, the duration for both hostile and non-hostile deployments was 
divided into three categories. The base category for each type was to have ‘no 
deployment.’ Other categories were to have ‘1 to 15 months’ and ‘more than 15 months’ 
of deployment. The results of this model are similar to the third model. Hostile 
deployments do not have significant effect on the decision to leave. Although the 
coefficients are positive, they are not statistically significant. This is also valid for the 
post-GWOT period. Only hostile deployments for more than 15 months in the post-
GWOT period seem to have a significant effect. On the other side, non-hostile 
deployments which last 1 to 15 months have a significant effect on decision to leave. An 
officer who served in non-hostile areas for 1 to 15 months is 7.2% points more likely to 
leave relative to the base case (officer without non-hostile experience). There is also an 
adverse effect in the post-GWOT period for officers who deployed in non-hostile areas 
for more than one month. Interaction variables indicated that as one stays more months in 
non-hostile areas, his/her probability to leave increases in the post-GWOT period 
compared to pre-GWOT period. An officer with more than 15 months experience in non-
hostile area is 23% points more likely to leave relative to his peer in the pre-GWOT 
period. The adverse effect of non-hostile deployment is still consistent for this model as 
was discussed in the third model.  
The purpose of the sixth model was to discuss the effect of frequency for both 
deployment types. The frequency of deployments was determined by looking at how 
many times an individual was sent to either hostile or non-hostile missions. Three 
categories were created to explain this. The base case was to have ‘no experience’ on any 
type of deployment. Others were to have ‘one hostile’ (or non-hostile) and ‘two or more 
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hostile’ (or non-hostile) deployments. Results indicated that experiencing more than one 
non-hostile deployment has an adverse effect on decision to stay. An officer with one 
non-hostile deployment is 7.3% points and one with two or more non-hostile 
deployments is 5.8% points more likely to leave the Army at the initial decision point 
compared to an officer in base case. Results of non-hostile deployments are greater for 
the post-GWOT period. An officer with one non-hostile deployment is 14.5% and other 
with two or more non-hostile deployments is 14.1% more likely to leave compared to 
base case for the post-GWOT period.(The results of full probit estimation for hostile vs. 
non-hostile models are provided in Appendix-A). 
E. VALIDATION OF EXPLANATORY VARIABLES AND DISCUSSION ON 
MODELS GOODNESS OF FIT RESULTS 
1. Likelihood Ratio Test 
To validate the explanatory variables, the Likelihood-Ratio Test was employed in 
this study. This test is similar to the F-test in OLS regressions which tests the joint 
significance of all of the explanatory variables. With the application of Likelihood Ratio 
Test, the main predictors are tested jointly. As discussed in the previous part, type, 
frequency, and duration characteristics of deployment were found as the primary 
predictors of separation. Therefore, in this section, deployment variables of each model 
were grouped and tested separately. Results of this test indicate whether these variables 
are jointly significant to explain the change in dependent variable. The restricted model 
for all tests is the ‘General Deployment Model’ without variables of DEPLOYED and 
DEPGWOT. The null hypothesis is that the variables tested here are not jointly 
significant. The results are presented in Table 21. The results strongly reject the null 







Model LR chi2 Prob > chi2 Identification of Test Result 
General Deployment Model LR chi2(2)  =    87.62 0.0000 Reject the null. The variables are jointly 
significant. 
Deployment Frequency Model LR chi2(4)  =     90.99 0.0000 Reject the null. The variables are jointly 
significant. 
Deployment Duration Model LR chi2(4)  =     87.70 0.0000 Reject the null. The variables are jointly 
significant. 
General Hostile Deployment Model LR chi2(6)  =    110.67 0.0000 Reject the null. The variables are jointly 
significant. 
Hostile Deployment Duration Model LR chi2(8)  =    123.12 0.0000 Reject the null. The variables are jointly 
significant 
Hostile Deployment Frequency Model LR chi2(8)  =    106.10 0.0000 Reject the null. The variables are jointly 
significant. 
Source: Author’s Likelihood Ratio test results of DMDC data 
 
Table 21.   Likelihood Ratio Test results for Models 
2. Chow Test 
The Chow test was used to see whether there are significant differences between 
two periods (pre- and the post-GWOT). Similar to the F-test and Likelihood-Ratio Test, 
this test looks for joint significance of variables. The result of this test shows whether or 
not there are differences across time in slope, intercept, or both. The first model is the 
unrestricted model for this test. Exclusions are postGWOT, DEPLOYED, and 
DEPGWOT variables for the restricted model. The null hypothesis is that there is no 
difference between the two periods. Table 22 presents the result of the Chow test. The 
result indicates that there are significant differences between two periods in slope -- 
intercept or both. 
Model LR chi2 Prob > chi2 Identification of Test 
Result 
General Deployment Model Chi2(  3) =   97.33 0.0000 Reject the null. There are 
significant differences 
between two periods in either 
slope -- intercept or both. 
Source: Author’s Chow test results of DMDC data 
 
Table 22.   Chow Test Result for General Deployment Model 
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3. R square Test 
The method used to assess model goodness of fit is based on the R squared value. 
In logit/probit models the basic R square is called the pseudo-R square. It basically 
measures the percent of the variation in the dependent variable depending on changes in 
explanatory variables. All six models have an average R square value of 8%. This 
indicates that explanatory variables in models explain roughly 8% of the variation 
observed in the dependent variable (LEAVE). 
 
Model Pseudo R square 
(1) General Deployment Model 0.0827 
(2) Deployment Frequency 
Model 
0.0831 
(3) Deployment Duration Model 0.0827 
(4) General Hostile Deployment 
Model 
0.0854 
(5) Hostile Deployment Duration 
Model 
0.0869 
(6) Hostile Deployment 
Frequency Model 
0.0849 
Source: Author’s Pseudo-R square test results of DMDC data 
 
Table 23.   Pseudo R Square for Probit Models 
 
F. SUMMARY 
The results of all models show that being deployed is a key factor in an officer’s 
decision to leave. Initially, it was expected that hostile deployments would have a greater 
effect relative to non-hostile deployments. This author understands that hostile 
deployments were more difficult with more dangerous missions. This would possibly 
affect the decision to leave positively. Surprisingly, Results showed that non-hostile 
deployments have a greater effect on the decision to leave. In addition to that, non-hostile 
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deployments are more effective in the post-GWOT period relative to the pre-GWOT 
period. This conclusion is not consistent with the previous studies. Findings of almost all 
studies suggested that both hostile and non-hostile deployments increase job satisfaction 
and results in higher retention. One possible reason for this difference might be having 
different cohorts in this study than in earlier studies. Alternatively, identification of 
explanatory variables, which are slightly different than other studies, might also cause 
different results relative to other studies. 
 
 77
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
Retention is one of key factors for decision makers to consider while shaping the 
needs for future manning requirements. A good understanding of retention behavior 
provides important information for planning purposes. In other words, assessing 
historical patterns gives lots of clues for tomorrow. In this study, the goal was to 
investigate the retention behavior of Military Academy graduates in the recent past. With 
a prominent history, the military Academy has been a source for almost every well-
known commandant in the history of U.S. Military. Some of these names are George 
Henry Thomas, Dwight Eisenhower, and H. Norman Schwarzkopf. In their times, these 
people, with their actions and decisions, not only shaped the U.S. Armed Forces, but also 
the United States of America and the world. Therefore, this author’s understanding is that 
this institute not only educates the commandants of Army only, but also the country’s 
future leaders. Any loss of its members could be highly detrimental to the U.S. Military, 
the nation, and the world.  
To understand and evaluate the retention behavior of Academy graduates, officers 
who graduated between 1994 and 2001 were examined. This was because, after several 
years of downsizing, the transition to a new and active military was over with the 
beginning of 1993. The second reason for this restriction was to focus only on the period 
of recent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. In comparison to other wars in the previous 
decade, these were implemented to fight against global terrorism and required long-
lasting and frequent deployments for all service members.  
Out of 7,512 officers who graduated between 1994 and 2001, 6,385 were 
examined in this study. Aviation officers were excluded. This was because it was the only 
Army branch requiring an ADSO (Active Duty Service Obligation) of more than five 
years. The primary focus was to investigate the retention behavior of these officers at 
their initial decision point -- 5 years after commissioning. Preliminary findings suggested 
that there is a sudden decrease in retention for the classes of 1999 and 2000. The 
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hypothesis of this thesis was that there might have been a correlation between recent 
deployments and these decreases in retention. Thus, two sets of models (six models in 
total) were estimated to examine whether such a correlation exists. To control the effect 
of other characteristics, demographic and military variables, such as gender, marital 














MODEL 1  
DEPLOYED 0.094***    
DEPGWOT 0.145***    
MODEL 2 
DEPLOY_1   0.073**  
DEPLOY_2MORE   0.107***  
DEPLOY_1GWOT   0.168***  
DEPLOY_2MOREGWOT   0.138***  
MODEL 3 
DEPLOY_15    0.098*** 
DEPLOY_15MORE    0.107*** 
DEPLOY_15GWOT    0.153*** 
DEPLOY15MOREGWOT    0.141*** 
MODEL 4 
ONHOSTILE  0.077**   
ONNONHOS  0.122***   
HOS_NONHOS  0.099***   
ONHOSTILEGWOT  0.031   
ONNONHOSGWOT  0.167***   
BOTHGWOT  0.156***   
MODEL 5 
HOS_15   0.016  
HOS_15MORE   0.051  
NONHOS_15   0.072***  
NONHOS_15MORE   -0.036  
HOS15GWOT   0.018  
HOS15MOREGWOT   -0.115*  
NONHOS15GWOT   0.145***  
NONHOS15MOREGWOT   0.238**  
MODEL 6 
HOSTILE1    -0.017 
HOSTILE1_MORE    0.043* 
NHOSTILE1    0.073*** 
NHOSTILE1_MORE    0.058** 
HOS1_GWOT    0.041 
HOS1MORE_GWOT    -0.031 
NHOS1_GWOT    0.145*** 
NHOS1MORE_GWOT    0.141*** 
Source: Author’s estimation results of DMDC data 
 
Table 24.   Summary of Marginal Effects of Deployment Variables 
 79
The result of the first model indicated that deployment in general had an adverse 
effect on retention. The magnitude of its effect was higher for the period after the start of 
OIF (post-GWOT period), than prior to the start of OIF. The second and third models 
were basically an extension of the main model with the addition of frequency and 
duration variables. The results suggest that whether an officer is deployed is the major 
factor in reducing the probability of staying and the negative effect increases substantially 
after GWOT. (Summary of marginal effects of all deployment variables are presented in 
Table 24). 
In the second set of models, the main goal was to compare two types of 
deployments (hostile and non-hostile) and examine the difference in their effects on the 
treatment group (the post-GWOT cohort). Therefore, three new models with variables of 
hostile and non-hostile deployments were estimated to attempt to identify duration and 
frequency effects for both types of deployment. The results indicated that both hostile and 
non-hostile deployments affect the decision to leave. However, non-hostile deployments 
had greater effects on the decision to leave than hostile deployments. In the post-GWOT 
period the retention effects of non-hostile deployments were even greater compared to the 
pre-GWOT period. It was also seen that duration and frequency were still effective 
predictors of retention. Specifically, 15 months or more of non-hostile deployment for an 
officer had a greater effect relative to another officer with no non-hostile experience. 
Based on the results, an officer with more than 15 months experience in a non-hostile 
area is 23 percentage points more likely to leave relative to his peer in the pre-GWOT 
period. 
It was also found that non-hostile deployments have greater adverse effects on 
personnel than hostile deployments. To this author’s understanding, if there is a certain 
deployment for an officer, most will prefer to serve in a combat area rather than serving 
in non-hostile areas. This study believes this is mostly relevant because it affects chances 
of early promotion. As Fricker (2002) stated in his study, “the right type of successful 
deployment can enhance an individual’s chances for promotion, since it distinguishes that 
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individual from his or her peers in a relevant manner.”25He also mentioned that frequent 
peacekeeping missions that are regarded as non-hostile deployments might not give the 
same kind of experience as one might get from operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. On 
the other side, there might also be a selection issue at play: those that were sent to non-
hostile regions might be deemed as less qualified and hence have higher probability to 
leave.  
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The results of this study indicated that deployment negatively affects the retention 
behavior of Academy graduates. Comparing two kinds of deployments also show that the 
negative retention effect of non-hostile deployments is higher than that of hostile 
deployments. A decline in numbers of officers staying might lead to manning shortages 
in the future. This shortage might be overcome by increasing the number of accessions 
from other officer sources. Therefore, one recommendation for the Army is to increase 
the number of accessions for ROTC and OCS. Alternatively, in order to keep the same 
representation of Academy graduate officers in the Army population, the number of 
cadets may also need to be increased gradually. Thus, in the next years, the Academy 
would need to graduate more officers than in previous classes but keep the same 
proportion in the career force. A thorough cost/benefit analysis might be useful in 
evaluating the optimal number of new accessions before considering this option. 
On the other side, the Army should take imminent actions to create new 
incentives for these young officers. One option is to increase the FSA and HFP 
allowances, thus balancing the negative aspects of deployment with additional 
compensation. This might create better motivation for the personnel who leave due to 
insufficient earnings. An alternative option is to increase the monthly payments for O-4 
and above and create an incentive for these young officers to stay longer.  
Decreasing the number of deployments should also be considered as a potential 
option. Some assignments in overseas can be reviewed and be voided with a detailed 
                                                 
25 Ronald D. Fricker. 2002. The effects of perstempo on officer retention in the U.S. military. Santa 
Monica, CA: RAND Org. 7. 
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needs assessment. Change in the number of assignments will obviously result in less 
frequent and shorter deployments for the current officers.  
C. FUTURE RESEARCH 
In this study, the type of deployment was identified as either hostile or non-hostile 
by looking at the Pay File Record. FSA (Family Separation Allowance), which identifies 
non-hostile deployments in the pay file, were provided only for married officers in the 
Pay File. Therefore, non-hostile deployments for single officers were not in the dataset, 
thus causing a self-selection problem for the study. As more data becomes available on 
deployment characteristics in the future, the outcomes of similar studies may produce 
stronger results. 
Additionally, economic factors that affect retention decisions were not discussed 
in this study. These factors, such as unemployment rate and civilian pay rates, are 
included in model specifications of other studies to strengthen the results. Therefore, in 
future studies, including economic indicators as other predictors of retention might 
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APPENDIX  
A. FULL PROBIT RESULTS FOR MODELS WITH GENERAL 
DEPLOYMENT CHARACTERISTICS 









FEMALE 0.025 0.027 0.024 
 (0.058) (0.058) (0.058) 
BLACK -0.243*** -0.242*** -0.243*** 
 (0.070) (0.070) (0.070) 
OTHER_RACE -0.141** -0.142** -0.141** 
 (0.066) (0.066) (0.066) 
HISPANIC -0.054 -0.056 -0.054 
 (0.087) (0.087) (0.087) 
MARRIED_ WITH_ 
CHILDREN 
-0.290*** -0.292*** -0.290*** 
 (0.035) (0.036) (0.036) 
SINGLE_ WITH_ 
CHILDREN 
-0.352*** -0.352*** -0.353*** 
 (0.134) (0.134) (0.134) 
MARRIED_ NO_ 
CHILDREN 
-0.027 -0.029 -0.027 
 (0.081) (0.081) (0.081) 
MASTER DEGREE -1.150*** -1.152*** -1.151*** 
 (0.062) (0.062) (0.062) 
COMSERV 0.091* 0.094* 0.091* 
 (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) 
COMBSUP 0.160*** 0.159*** 0.160*** 
 (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) 
postGWOT -0.266*** -0.267*** -0.266*** 
 (0.096) (0.096) (0.096) 
DEPLOYED 0.273***   
 (0.061)   
DEPGWOT 0.397***   
 (0.103)   
DEPLOY_1  0.196***  
  (0.076)  
DEPLOY_2MORE  0.301***  
  (0.063)  
DEPLOY_1GWOT  0.438***  
  (0.127)  
DEPLOY_2MOREGWOT  0.375***  
  (0.105)  
DEPLOY_15   0.271*** 
   (0.062) 
DEPLOY_15MORE   0.289*** 
   (0.102) 
DEPLOY_15GWOT   0.404*** 
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   (0.107) 
DEPLOY15MOREGWOT   0.376*** 
   (0.133) 
Constant -0.372*** -0.372*** -0.372*** 
 (0.058) (0.058) (0.058) 
Observations 6385 6385 6385 
Standard errors in 
parentheses 
   
* significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1% 
   
B. FULL PROBIT RESULTS FOR MODELS WITH HOSTILE VERSUS 
NON-HOSTILE DEPLOYMENTS 

















FEMALE 0.025 0.022 0.016 0.015 
 (0.058) (0.058) (0.058) (0.058) 
BLACK -0.243*** -0.246*** -0.253*** -0.248*** 
 (0.070) (0.070) (0.070) (0.070) 
OTHER_RACE -0.141** -0.138** -0.132** -0.136** 
 (0.066) (0.066) (0.066) (0.066) 
HISPANIC -0.054 -0.054 -0.049 -0.057 
 (0.087) (0.087) (0.087) (0.087) 
MARRIED_ WITH_ 
CHILDREN 
-0.290*** -0.315*** -0.315*** -0.299*** 
 (0.035) (0.036) (0.037) (0.039) 
MARRIED_ NO_ 
CHILDREN 
-0.027 -0.036 -0.025 -0.025 
 (0.081) (0.081) (0.081) (0.082) 
SINGLE_ WITH_ 
CHILDREN 
-0.352*** -0.380*** -0.369*** -0.359*** 
 (0.134) (0.135) (0.135) (0.135) 
MASTER DEGREE -1.150*** -1.151*** -1.160*** -1.151*** 
 (0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.062) 
COMSERV 0.091* 0.089* 0.087* 0.092* 
 (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) 
COMBSUP 0.160*** 0.159*** 0.175*** 0.164*** 
 (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) 
postGWOT -0.266*** -0.268*** -0.228*** -0.225*** 
 (0.096) (0.096) (0.080) (0.080) 
DEPLOYED 0.273***    
 (0.061)    
DEPGWOT 0.397***    
 (0.103)    
ONHOSTILE  0.206**   
  (0.087)   
ONNONHOS  0.323***   
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  (0.077)   
HOS_NONHOS  0.278***   
  (0.065)   
ONHOSTILEGWOT  0.083   
  (0.147)   
ONNONHOSGWOT  0.434***   
  (0.128)   
BOTHGWOT  0.421***   
  (0.106)   
HOS_15   0.044  
   (0.052)  
HOS_15MORE   0.138  
   (0.186)  
NONHOS_15   0.201***  
   (0.055)  
NONHOS_15MORE   -0.102  
   (0.252)  
HOS15GWOT   0.048  
   (0.081)  
HOS15MOREGWOT   -0.341*  
   (0.203)  
NONHOS15GWOT   0.391***  
   (0.088)  
NONHOS15MOREGWOT   0.614**  
   (0.269)  
HOSTILE1    -0.047 
    (0.065) 
HOSTILE1_MORE    0.118* 
    (0.063) 
NHOSTILE1    0.199*** 
    (0.060) 
NHOSTILE1_MORE    0.159** 
    (0.068) 
HOS1_GWOT    0.112 
    (0.099) 
HOS1MORE_GWOT    -0.087 
    (0.089) 
NHOS1_GWOT    0.387*** 
    (0.094) 
NHOS1MORE_GWOT    0.374*** 
    (0.103) 
Constant -0.372*** -0.361*** -0.301*** -0.303*** 
 (0.058) (0.058) (0.051) (0.052) 
Observations 6385 6385 6385 6385 
Standard errors in 
parentheses 
    
* significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1% 
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